FELICIANO BENEBY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the summary denial of Beneby's rule 3.850 post-conviction motion for ineffective assistance of counsel, but allowed resubmission within thirty days with additional factual allegations demonstrating prejudice. The court clarified that prejudice must be shown even when counsel allegedly conceded guilt of a lesser included offense.
The motion was properly denied as lacking sufficient factual allegations demonstrating prejudice, but Beneby may resubmit within thirty days with such allegations. The Strickland two-part test applies: counsel's performance must be deficient and the deficiency must have prejudiced the outcome. The timeliness requirement was satisfied as the motion was filed within two years of the resentencing in 2002, making a prejudice showing the critical issue for resubmission.
[1] To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that counsel's de…
[2] A defendant must demonstrate prejudice to obtain post-conviction relief when alleging that counsel conceded guilt of a lesser included offense, as opposed to the charged…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, movants must show that their counsel's performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that counsel's deficient performance affected the outcome of the proceeding.”
Establishes the two-part Strickland standard applicable to ineffective assistance claims
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBeneby filed a rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed his trial counsel conceded his guil…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the summary denial of defendant Feliciano Beneby’s rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief. The motion was denied without prejudice to resubmit it within thirty days, adding factual allegations demonstrating that the alleged deficiencies of Beneby’s trial counsel prejudiced him.
In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, movants must show that their counsel’s performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that counsel’s deficient performance affected the outcome of the proceeding. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Defendant argues that he need not demonstrate prejudice because he alleged that counsel conceded his guilt; however, that principle applies when counsel concedes the accused’s guilt of the charged offense. Harvey v. State, — So. 2d -, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S513, 2003 WL 21511339 (Fla. July 3, 2003); Kleppinger v. State, 884 So. 2d 146, 2004 WL 1618532 (Fla. 2d DCA July 21, 2004). His allegation, however, was that counsel conceded his guilt of a lesser included offense. Thus, prejudice must be demonstrated in order to obtain post-conviction relief. See State v. Williams, 797 So. 2d 1235, 1240-41 (Fla.2001); Davis v. State, 866 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Harris v. State, 768 So. 2d 1179, 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
The state’s response below also raised a timeliness issue which it suggested the resubmitted motion should address. We point out, however, that if, as he alleged, Beneby was resentenced in November 2002 after this court reversed his initial sentence on direct appeal, his motion, filed in April or May 2004,1 was clearly timely filed within two years from the time his conviction and sentence became final, despite the fact that the mandate from the direct appeal issued in 2001. Pierce v. State, 875 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Snipes v. State, 843 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Thus, he need not further address timeliness in his resubmitted motion — which should be filed with the trial court within thirty days after the issuance of the mandate in this appeal.
GUNTHER, WARNER and MAY, JJ., concur. . The filing date on the motion included in the record provided to this court is unclear.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984)
- State v. Williams, 797 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 2001)
- Harris v. State, 768 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Snipes v. State, 843 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Vargas v. State, 875 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Williams v. State, 884 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
- Shannetta M. Davis v. State, 866 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)