MICHAEL I. ROSE, APPELLANT,
v.
RONA ROSE, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the trial court awarded a homemaker wife $120,000 in temporary attorney's fees and $15,000 in accounting costs to equalize representation against her high-earning attorney husband. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Florida law permits interim fee awards to ensure impecunious spouses have equal access to counsel.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding temporary attorney's fees and costs. Trial courts have broad discretion in ordering payment of temporary fees based on the parties' respective need and ability to pay, and such awards are necessary to equalize representation and prevent a financially advantaged spouse from overpowering the other.
[1] A trial court has broad discretion to order temporary attorney's fees and costs in dissolution proceedings based on the parties' respective need and ability to pay.
[2] The purpose of statutory provisions authorizing interim awards of attorney's fees and costs in dissolution proceedings is to ensure both parties have similar access to co…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the law does not permit one party with substantial means to overpower the other by denying that party the right to equal representation”
Establishes the fundamental principle underlying temporary attorney's fee awards in dissolution proceedings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter eight years of marriage with one child, a 36-year-old homemaker wife sought dissolution from her 57-year-old attorney husband who earned approxi…
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PER CURIAM.
Michael Rose (“husband”) appeals an order granting his wife, Roña Rose (“wife”), temporary attorneys fees and costs in a dissolution proceeding. We affirm.
After eight years of marriage and one child, the wife, a thirty-six year old full-time homemaker, sought a dissolution of marriage from her fifty-seven year old husband. Thereafter, the wife filed a motion for an interim award of attorney’s fees and costs. At the time of the temporary fee hearing, the husband, a successful attorney, listed assets on his financial affidavit in excess of $2,700,000.00. These assets included the parties’ marital residence ($2,500,000) and the husband’s Bentley ($80,000).
During the course of the three day temporary fee hearing, evidence was presented that the husband’s annual income from his law practice was approximately $400,000.1 The wife had no income or assets. Both parties presented expert witness testimony from forensic accountants. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the trial court awarded the wife $120,000 in attorney’s fees, and $15,000 in accounting costs.
Section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2003), authorizes interim awards of attorney’s fees, suit money, and costs. The purpose of Section 61.16, is to make certain that both parties to a dissolution proceeding have similar access to counsel. See Pefaur v. Pefaur, 617 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)(“[T]he law does not permit one party with substantial means to overpower the other by denying that party the right to equal representation.”). As emphasized by the Florida Supreme Court, interim awards of attorney’s fees and costs are required “to mitigate the harm an impecunious spouse would suffer where the other spouse’s financial advantage accords him or her an unfair ability to obtain legal assistance.” Nichols v. Nichols, 519 So. 2d 620, 621-22 (Fla.1988).
Trial courts have broad discretion in ordering the payment of temporary fees and costs based upon the parties’ respective need and ability to pay. See Pedraja v. Garcia, 667 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In the present case, we find no abusé of discretion in the trial courts well-reasoned order which requires the husband to pay the wife’s temporary attorney’s fees and costs in order to equalize the representation of the parties.
The record amply supports the trial court’s findings based upon the significant disparity in the parties’ overall financial circumstances and earning capacities. Moreover, the wife met her burden of proving the reasonableness of the fees and the necessity of the fees sought. See Safford v. Safford, 656 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Accordingly, we affirm the order below in all respects. See 61.16, Fla. Stat. (2003); Nash v. Nash, 688 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Piluso v. Piluso, 622 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
Affirmed.
. Evidence was also presented that the husband had a pattern of borrowing from credit cards, credit lines and banks to pay his bills. The husband used his credit card to pay his own attorney and accountant in the amount of $47,000 and $9,000. Just prior to the temporary fee hearing, the husband received $480,000 in settlement monies from an arbitration proceeding. The husband used these fund to pay his personal debts.
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Young v. Young, 898 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…ensure that both parties to a dissolution case have similar access to counsel and that neither has an unfair ability to obtain legal assistance because of the other’s financial advantage. Nichols v. Nichols, 519 So. 2d 620 (Fla.1988); Rose v. Rose, 883 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). The facts of this case are strikingly similar to those of Rose v. Rose, supra. The Rose case involved the dissolution of an eight-year marriage between a fifty-seven-year-old attorney and a thirty-six-year-old full-time hom…
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Breton v. Raud, 422 So. 3d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025)
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Amruta Nilay Shah v. Nilay R. Shah (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)…llee. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Victoria del Pino, Judge. Amruta Nilay Shah, in proper person. Nilay R. Shah, in proper person. Before EMAS, C.J., and SCALES and LOBREE, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Rose v. Rose, 883 So. 2d 348, 350 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (noting the movant’s burden in presenting sufficient evidence to support a motion for temporary attorney’s fees); Phillips v. Phillips, 264 So. 3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (holding that to “enable the court to make th…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Nichols v. Nichols, 519 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 1988)
- Pedraja v. Garcia, 667 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Safford v. Safford, 656 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Crosby v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 622 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Nash v. Nash, 688 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Pefaur v. Pilar Pefaur, 617 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)