STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DAYLE THOMPSON, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The State appealed a suppression order in a cocaine possession case, challenging the circuit court's ruling that evidence was obtained through an illegal warrantless entry. The appellate court agreed the search was illegal but reversed and remanded because the circuit court failed to make a proper standing determination based on record evidence rather than counsel's assertions.
Thompson had standing to challenge the search only if he could prove a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises, which requires record evidence, not merely counsel's assertions. The court agreed the officers' entry and seizure were illegal, but remanded for a proper standing determination because the circuit court ruled on standing without allowing Thompson to present sworn testimony.
[1] A defendant challenging a search and seizure must prove a reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched premises when standing is questioned.
[2] A trial court's determination of standing must be supported by record evidence, not solely by counsel's assertions.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the State questions the defendant's standing to challenge a search and seizure, the defendant must prove that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises searched.”
Establishes the legal standard for standing in search and seizure cases
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice officers entered an apartment to detain a man they believed was a wanted felon and discovered cocaine inside. Thompson, a visitor to the apartm…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Standing To Contest Search And Seizure cases and more on FLexlaw
NORTHCUTT, Judge.
The State charged Dayle Thompson with possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. The cocaine was seized inside an apartment when police officers entered it to detain another man they believed was a wanted felon. Thompson moved to suppress the drugs, contending that the officers who discovered them had failed to comply with the “knock and announce” requirement of section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2000), and that no exigent circumstances supported the officers’ unauthorized entry into the home.
The circuit court suppressed the evidence on those grounds.
We agree with the court’s conclusion that the officers’ entry into the home and seizure of the drugs were illegal. But we reverse the suppression order and remand for further proceedings to make an additional determination that is necessary to the resolution of this matter. At the suppression hearing the State objected that Thompson, a visitor to the apartment, did not have standing to contest the search and seizure.
The circuit court immediately overruled the State’s objection, but then said it would take evidence on the issue. Thompson’s counsel responded that “he has standing ... because he’s here for trial because they are attributing this cocaine to him in a criminal case.” At that point, the court again overruled the State’s objection.
When the State questions the defendant’s standing to challenge a search and seizure, the defendant must prove that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); State v. Suco, 521 So. 2d 1100, 1102 (Fla.1988).
The circuit court’s determination of standing must be supported by record evidence, not just counsel’s assertions. State v. Gibson, 670 So. 2d 1006, 1008 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
This is because argument of counsel is not evidence. DiSarrio v. Mills, 711 So. 2d 1355, 1357 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
Even if it were, the test for standing is not whether the defendant might go to prison, but whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises searched. See State v. Brown, 575 So. 2d 763, 764 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
Numerous cases analyze what must be shown for a guest to have the requisite expectation of privacy to challenge a search of a premises he is visiting. See, e.g., Suco, 521 So. 2d at 1102-03; McCauley v. State, 842 So. 2d 897, 900 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); State v. Mallory, 409 So. 2d 1222, 1223-24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Here, there was no evidence on which the circuit court could determine whether Thompson had standing or not. We cannot fault Thompson for failing to meet his burden of proof on this issue because the court overruled the State’s objection before he had an opportunity to present sworn testimony.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new suppression hearing on the issue of standing only. If the circuit court determines that Thompson has standing, it shall grant his motion to suppress based on the fact that the search and seizure were otherwise illegal.
ALTENBERND, C.J., and STRINGER, J., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (U.S. 1978)
- DiSARRIO v. Mills, 711 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- State v. Suco, 521 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1988)
- McCAULEY v. State, 842 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Taylor v. State, 409 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- State v. Murray C. Mallory, 409 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- State v. Brown, 575 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- State v. Gibson, 670 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)