JON G. WEBER, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Jon Weber appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that a Florida statute mandating license revocation for felony DUI violates the single subject rule and that he should not be barred from applying for a hardship license. The court affirmed the denial, holding that Weber's proper remedy lies with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV), not the criminal court.
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief, holding that a defendant's proper remedy for challenging an unlawful license revocation by the DHSMV lies with the agency itself, not in the criminal court. If the DHSMV acts unlawfully, the defendant may seek appropriate remedies at that time, but the criminal court is not the proper forum for such relief.
[1] A statute enacted in violation of the single subject rule of the Florida Constitution is invalid.
[2] A criminal court case is not the proper venue to challenge an administrative license revocation by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Appellant's remedy is properly with the agency that allegedly revoked his license, the DHSMV. If the DHSMV acts unlawfully in failing to rescind Appellant's revocation or otherwise revokes Appellant's license without lawful purpose, Appellant may avail himself of the appropriate remedy at that time.”
Establishes that the proper forum for challenging license revocation is the administrative agency (DHSMV), not the criminal court.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWeber was convicted of felony driving under the influence on February 28, 2002. Under section 322.26(l)(a), Florida Statutes, the DHSMV is required to…
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PER CURIAM.
On February 28, 2002, in circuit court case No. 01-32955, Appellant was convicted of the offense of felony driving under the influence. Pursuant to section 322.26(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1998 Supp.), the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) is required to revoke the license or driving privilege of a person convicted of this offense. In Department of Highway Safety & Motor Veh icles v. Critchfield, 805 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), however, this court declared that this law, enacted as part of section 8 of Chapter 98-223, Laws of Florida, was invalid because it was enacted in violation of the single subject rule of the Florida Constitution. The Florida Supreme Court recently affirmed this ruling. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Critchfield, 842 So. 2d 782 (Fla.2003).
In July of 2002, Appellant, acting pro-se and relying on this court’s Cñtchfield opinion, filed a “Complaint for Summary Judgment” in which he sought a declaration that the statute is in violation of the single subject rule and a further declaration that he “would not be legally barred from applying for a hardship license.” The complaint was filed within criminal circuit court case 01-32955. The trial court denied the ‘complaint’ noting that the revocation of the license was not a part of Appellant’s criminal sentence but, rather, an action that was to be performed by the DHSMV. The court further noted that unless and until the DHSMV takes action, there is no matter in controversy.
Appellant claimed in his motion seeking relief that, in fact, the DHSMV had revoked his license. We find, however, that regardless of whether a revocation has already taken place, Appellant’s motion for relief filed within his criminal court case was properly denied. Appellant’s remedy is properly with the agency that allegedly revoked his license, the DHSMV. If the DHSMV acts unlawfully in failing to rescind Appellant’s revocation or otherwise revokes Appellant’s license without lawful purpose, Appellant may avail himself of the appropriate remedy at that time. See Lickman v. State, 810 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Holveck v. State, 730 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Fla. R.App. P. 9.030(c)(3).
ORDER DENYING RELIEF AFFIRMED.
SAWAYA, PLEUS and TORPY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Fla. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Critchfield, 842 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2003)
- Blocker v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n & Barton Protective Servs., 805 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Hubbard v. State, 842 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2003)
- Yarrell v. State, 730 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Holveck v. State, 730 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Colby McCOGGLE v. State, 810 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)