STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, O/B/O CHRISTINA G. CRANE, APPELLANT,
v.
MICHAEL H. FACKLER, APPELLEE
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The Florida First District Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment in a paternity action, holding that the trial court erred by either failing to consider or improperly rejecting an amended affidavit that corrected a typographical error regarding the date of conception. The court emphasized that in paternity cases, the best interests of the child require consideration of late-filed supplemental affidavits that offer reasonable explanations for discrepancies.
The trial court erred by either failing to consider the amended affidavit or rejecting it as a matter of law. Florida law and the rules of civil procedure permit trial courts to accept late-filed supplemental affidavits in their discretion, particularly where a simple and reasonable explanation exists for the discrepancy and the relief sought is unchanged. In paternity cases, the best interests of the child require such consideration. If considered, the amended affidavit creates a genuine dispute of material fact regarding paternity, precluding summary judgment.
[1] A trial court has discretion to accept supplemental affidavits in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, even if such affidavits are untimely.
[2] A trial court may refuse to accept a supplemental affidavit if it conflicts with an earlier-filed affidavit from the same party, particularly if the supplemental document…
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Establishes the discretionary standard for accepting late-filed supplemental affidavits when they offer reasonable explanations
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe original affidavit of paternity alleged sexual relations between the mother and appellee in April and May of 1998, resulting in a child born Janua…
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BROWNING, J.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment in a paternity action. The dispute centers on whether an amended affidavit of paternity should have been considered by the trial court. We hold that the affidavit should have been considered, or if it was considered that the trial court erred as a matter of law, and thus reverse.
The original affidavit of paternity alleged that sexual relations between the mother and the Appellee in April and May of 1998 resulted in the birth of a child on January 27, 2000. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that a gestation period of 20 months was physically impossible in humans. In an attempt to correct the typographical error, Appellant filed an amended paternity affidavit alleging that sexual relations occurred in April and May of 1999. This amended affidavit was received by Appellee’s counsel the Friday before a Monday hearing, and he objected at that hearing to lack of notice. The trial court granted summary judgment for Appellee.
Appellant admits that the amended affidavit was served late. See Fla. Fam. L.R.P. 12.510, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). However, both Florida’s Rules of Civil Procedure and case law permit a trial court, in its discretion, to accept affidavits to supplement other affidavits, even if the supplemental affidavits are late. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e); Roberts by and through Drusko v. Abrunzo, 604 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Trial courts need not accept supplemental affidavits that conflict with earlier-filed affidavits from the same party. See International Cmty. Corp.Tampa v. Davis Water and Waste Indus., Inc., 455 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). However, International Cmty. is not controlling because here Appellant presents a simple, reasonable explanation for the discrepancy, and the change does not affect the relief sought, whereas in International Cmty., the supplemental document relied on different sections of law and used updated financial figures.
It is not clear that the trial court considered the second affidavit. Rule 1.510(e) and the above case law give the trial court discretion to consider the second affidavit. Because the most important consideration in a paternity case is the best interest of the child, the trial court should have considered the second affidavit. See, e.g., Department of Revenue ex rel. R.A.E. v. M.L.S., 756 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Accordingly, if the trial court did not consider that document, the trial court abused its discretion.
If the trial court did consider the second affidavit, it is clear that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Appellee, because the second affidavit’s allegations that sexual relations occurred between the mother and the Appellee nine months before the birth of the child allow a reasonable inference of a genuine dispute of material fact, namely, whether Appellee is the father. See Albelo v. Southern Bell, 682 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), citing Pan Am. Distributing Co. v. Sav-A-Stop, Inc., 124 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960).
Accordingly, we REVERSE the summary judgment, and REMAND to the trial court for further proceedings.
ALLEN, C.J. and WEBSTER, J., CONCUR.
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Sheridan v. Rennhack, 200 So. 3d 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)…Lander v. Smith, 906 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). A summary judgment must be reversed if there is evidence before the court which supports “a reasonable inference of a genuine dispute of material fact.” State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Fackler, 843 So. 2d 994, 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “On a motion for summary judgment the trial court is not authorized to try or weigh facts.” Jones v. Stoutenburgh, 91 So. 2d 299, 302 (Fla.1956). Likewise, the trial court may not consider “either the weight of conflicting…
Authorities Cited
- Albelo v. S. Bell k/n/a Bell S. Telecomms., Inc., 682 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- PAN Am. Distrib. Co. v. Sav-A-Stop, 124 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)
- Fla. Dep't OF Revenue ex rel. R.A.E. v. M.L.S., 756 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Asiner v. Oriole Homes Corp., 455 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Int'l Cmty. Corporation-Tampa & the Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Davis Water & Waste Indus., Inc., 455 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Mobil OIL Corp., 604 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Roberts v. Abrunzo, 604 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)