JEFF J. JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, APPELLEE
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Jones, a convicted second-degree murderer, appealed the trial court's denial of his application for additional overcrowding gain time credits and Control Release credits. The appellate court affirmed, holding that while Jones received all provisional gain time credits he had already earned, he was not entitled to future unawarded credits, nor was he eligible for Control Release credits as a convicted murderer.
Jones was not entitled to additional gain time credits that had not yet been awarded when the canceling statute was enacted, nor was he eligible for Control Release credits. As a convicted murderer, he was statutorily ineligible for the Control Release program. While he retained all provisional gain time credits previously awarded to him under Lynce v. Mathis, he could not claim future unawarded credits.
[1] A convicted murderer is not eligible for credits under the Control Release program.
[2] Inmates are entitled to provisional gain time credits that have already been awarded and cannot be deprived of them.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“as a person designated in Gomez v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 499 (Fla.1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 822, 120 S.Ct. 67, 145 L.Ed.2d 58 (1999) as a member of Offender Group 5, Gomez, 733 So. 2d at 513 n. 3, he had in fact been granted, as required by Lynce, all the provisional gain time credits which had already been awarded and of which he therefore could not be deprived.”
Establishes that Jones retained all previously awarded gain time credits under the Lynce standard.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones was a convicted second-degree murderer in custody of the Florida Department of Corrections. He sought additional overcrowding gain time credits …
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
We find that the trial court properly denied the application of the appellant, a convicted second degree murderer in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections, for additional overcrowding gain time credits, see Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997), and for credits equivalent to those granted to inmates eligible for Control Release. Our review of the record shows that as a person designated in Gomez v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 499 (Fla.1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 822, 120 S.Ct. 67, 145 L.Ed.2d 58 (1999) as a member of Offender Group 5, Gomez, 733 So. 2d at 513 n. 3, he had in fact been granted, as required by Lynce, all the provisional gain time credits which had already been awarded and of which he therefore could not be deprived. As Gomez squarely holds, however, he was not entitled, as he argues, to additional credits which had not yet been awarded when section 944.278, Florida Statutes (1993), which purported to cancel all such credits, was enacted. See Winkler v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 63 (Fla.2002). Furthermore, as a convicted murderer, he was not eligible for and thus was not entitled to credits under the Control Release program. Gomez, 733 So. 2d at 5061; see also Winkler, 831 So. 2d at 65-67; Meola v. Department of Corrections, 732 So. 2d 1029 (Fla.1998).
Affirmed.
. The petitioners also argue that for the years in which Control Release allotments were awarded they should receive the much higher number of Control Release allotments that were given to the Control Release eligible inmates. We conclude that under the Ex Post Facto Clause, the petitioners are only entitled to the number of credits that should have been awarded under the prior statutes, not what other inmates were actually awarded under the Control Release program. To do otherwise would result in an undue windfall for the petitioners.
Gomez, 733 So. 2d at 506.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (U.S. 1997)
- Gomez v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1998)
- Meola v. Dep't OF Corr., 732 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1998)
- Winkler v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 2002)
- Potts v. United States, 528 U.S. 822 (U.S. 1999)
- Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. Gomez, 528 U.S. 822 (U.S. 1999)