DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, PETITIONER,
v.
MARTIN MATTHEW DOBRIN, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
This case concerns whether a traffic stop was lawful when an officer observed a driver speeding and swerving. The appellate court found the lower court erred by applying the wrong legal standard, holding that the stop was permissible if a reasonable officer would have made it under the circumstances, not just based on the specific reasons articulated by the arresting officer.
Yes, the circuit court erred by applying the wrong legal standard. The lawfulness of a traffic stop is determined by whether the established facts would have caused a reasonable officer to make the stop, not solely by the specific reasons articulated by the arresting officer.
[1] A traffic stop is lawful if the established facts would have caused a reasonable officer to make the stop, regardless of the specific subjective reasons of the arresting…
[2] Driving at a high rate of speed and an inability to maintain a straight course can constitute reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The issue is not why this particular officer conducted the traffic stop; the question should be whether the established facts would have caused a reasonable officer under the same circumstances to make the stop.”
This quote establishes the legal standard the court applied to evaluate the traffic stop.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn officer observed Martin Dobrin driving a truck at a high speed and swerving within his lane. The officer initiated a traffic stop, during which he …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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HARRIS, J.
In this case, an officer observed Dobrin driving a truck going very fast (approximately 50 miles per hour) and drifting to the right and correcting himself in a quick manner on several occasions. The officer pulled Dobrin over and ticketed him for failure to maintain a single lane. During this procedure, the officer noticed Dobrin’s bloodshot eyes and detected the odor of alcohol on his breath. He conducted a field sobriety test which Dobrin failed. Because Dobrin refused to take a breath test, the Department suspended his license. The circuit trial court granted certiorari and quashed the suspension order. The State seeks certiorari before this court and we grant it.
The reason given for the circuit trial court’s action was that the arrest affidavit did not specifically allege that Dobrin crossed either line of the traffic lane and further failed to allege the posted speed limit of the street at the point where the officer observed the “fast” speed. The court refused to consider an alternative basis for the stop stating: “This court finds that it cannot uphold the stop on a basis of what the officer could have done, rather it must only analyze what in fact the officer did and why he did it.” Here, the court applied the wrong law. The issue is not why this particular officer conducted the traffic stop; the question should be whether the established facts would have caused a reasonable officer under the same circumstances to make the stop. See State v. Pollard, 625 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); see also State v. McNeal, 666 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). In other words, would it be unreasonable for an officer who observed one driving a truck at a high rate of speed and unable to maintain a straight course to pull the driver over to check the safety of the vehicle, the health of the driver or the capacity of the driver?
Because we believe the court below applied the wrong law, we grant certiorari and quash the circuit trial court’s order quashing the suspension.
PETITION GRANTED.
PETERSON, J., concurs.
GRIFFIN, J., dissents, without opinion.
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Dobrin v. Fla. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 874 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2004)…district court in this case failed to apply that standard. Instead, it analyzed “whether the established facts would have caused a reasonable officer under the same circumstances to make the stop.” Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Dobrin, 829 So. 2d 922, 922 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). This Court articulated the reasonable officer standard in 1995, before the Supreme Court decided Whren. See State v. Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040, 1046 (Fla.1995). In Holland, we acknowledged that Whren rejected that standard in…1 / 3
Authorities Cited
- State v. Deen, 625 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- State v. McNEAL, 666 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)