KATIE ALVAREZ, PETITIONER,
v.
CITY OF PLANTATION, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Petitioner Katie Alvarez challenges a civil forfeiture seizure by the City of Plantation, seeking a writ of prohibition based on alleged due process violations from delayed post-seizure proceedings. The court dismisses the petition, finding that the writ of prohibition is improper because the petitioner had waived the statutory time limits for forfeiture proceedings.
The court dismisses the writ of prohibition without prejudice, holding that the petitioner's waiver of the statutory time limits is dispositive and distinguishes the case from precedent establishing that the forty-five-day filing deadline may be jurisdictional. The court further holds that even if a constitutional right were implicated, a delay in civil forfeiture proceedings is not analogous to a criminal defendant's fundamental right against double jeopardy and therefore does not justify a writ of prohibition.
[1] A writ of prohibition lies to prevent an inferior tribunal from acting in excess of jurisdiction, not to prevent an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.
[2] Subject matter jurisdiction, which is the power of the court to preside over a class of cases, cannot be waived.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Prohibition lies to prevent an inferior tribunal from acting in excess of jurisdiction but not to prevent an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that writs of prohibition are limited to cases where a court acts without jurisdiction, not merely exercises jurisdiction incorrectly.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe City of Plantation seized currency and jewelry belonging to petitioner Alvarez under Florida's civil forfeiture law. After seizure, petitioner's c…
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KLEIN, J.
The City of Plantation seized, under our civil forfeiture law, currency and jewelry owned by petitioner. Alleging that the city is denying her due process rights by improperly delaying post-seizure proceedings, petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition, citing In re Forfeiture of One (1) 1991 Honda Prelude, 730 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). In Honda Prelude the fifth district granted a writ of prohibition, concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in a forfeiture case where the government did not file its complaint for forfeiture within forty-five days of seizure. See §§ 932.704 and 932.701(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997).
Our supreme court, in English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 297 (Fla.1977), stated:
Prohibition lies to prevent an inferior tribunal from acting in excess of juris diction but not to prevent an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. In this state, circuit courts are superior courts of general jurisdiction, and nothing is intended to be outside their jurisdiction except that which clearly and specially appears so to be.
In Mandico v. Taos Construction, Inc., 605 So. 2d 850, 854 (Fla.1992), the court repeated the above quote, emphasizing “clearly” and “specially.”
In In re Forfeiture of One 1988 Lincoln Town Car, VIN 1LNBM81F8JY612959, 826 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), the second district, in a final appeal, held that the statutory time limit in forfeiture proceedings is not jurisdictional and certified conflict with Honda Prelude.
In the present case, after petitioner’s property was seized, she waived, in a letter from her counsel, both the ten day statutory requirement for the scheduling of a preliminary hearing and the forty-five day statutory requirement for the city to file its complaint. The waiver was to give the parties time to negotiate a settlement. She argues, however, that so much time elapsed after it became apparent that the case could not be settled, that by now proceeding the city is violating her due process rights.
Because of petitioner’s waiver, we find this case distinguishable from Honda Prelude and need not reach the issue of whether the forty-five day time limit for filing the complaint is jurisdictional. Petitioner argues that it is-jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Although subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, Cates v. Heffernan, 154 Fla. 422, 18 So. 2d 11 (1944), the circuit court clearly had jurisdiction over the subject matter in this case. Quigley v. Cremin, 94 Fla. 104, 113 So. 892 (1927)(subject matter jurisdiction means the power of the court to preside over the class of cases to which the particular case belongs).
Courts also, as petitioner points out, grant writs of prohibition in criminal cases, even though the trial court technically has jurisdiction, where a defendant’s fundamental constitutional right, such as not to be subjected to double jeopardy, will be violated if the trial court proceeds. State v. Strawn, 307 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); quashed on other grounds, Strawn v. State, 332 So. 2d 601 (Fla.1976). A delay in a forfeiture proceeding, which is civil, is not analogous to violating a criminal defendant’s right to not be put in double jeopardy.
We therefore dismiss the writ of prohibition for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to petitioner’s raising this issue on appeal from a final order. STONE and WARNER, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Hernandez v. Kissimmee Police Dep't, 901 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…mely would result in.dismissal of the forfeiture action. Instead, the court held that if a seizing agency fails to timely file a forfeiture complaint the proceeding could be dismissed on the claimant’s motion. See also Alvarez v. City of Plantation, 824 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(holding that the owner of seized property could waive the 45-day statutory requirement, despite the owner’s claim that the time limit was jurisdictional). Two other recent cases have addressed the issue of whether similar statut…
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Watson v. State, 213 So. 3d 917 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…er v. Snider, 686 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); see also Ingraham v. State, 122 So. 3d 934, 935 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). Moreover, neither such jurisdiction, nor the ability to protest its absence, can be waived. See Alvarez v. City of Plantation, 824 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Waggy v. State, 935 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (quoting Young v. State, 439 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)). The state attempts to analogize the agreement here to a Quarterman agreement. See Quarterman v. Sta…
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Joshua v. City OF Fort Lauderdale, 230 So. 3d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…11-20057(25), filed in the 17th Judicial.Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida. See DeGregorio v. Balkwill, 853 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2003); Hernandez v. Kissimmee Police Dep’t, 901 So. 2d 420, 422 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Alvarez v. City of Plantation, 824 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); cf. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Regulation, 587 So. 2d 1378, 1390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (noting statute seemingly mandatory in terms because of the use of the word “shall,” is designed simply to furt…
Authorities Cited
- Carey English v. McCRARY, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977)
- Mandico v. Taos Constr., Inc., 605 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1992)
- Quigley v. Cremin, 94 Fla. 104 (Fla. 1927)
- Fay W. Cates & Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Heffernan, 154 Fla. 422 (Fla. 1944)
- Honorable David U. Strawn v. State of Fla. ex rel. Jon Anderberg, 332 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1976)
- In re Forfeiture OF ONE (1) 1994 Honda Prelude Brad Webb v. Dep't of Hwy. Safety, 730 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- In re Forfeiture of One 1988 Lincoln Town CAR v. DeGregorio, 826 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Jon Anderberg v. Honorable David U. Strawn, 307 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)