SCOTT HARTNEY AND KAREN HARTNEY, APPELLANTS,
v.
PIEDMONT TECHNOLOGY, INC. A GEORGIA CORPORATION, AND KELLER-GILES APPRAISAL GROUP, CHTD, A FLORIDA PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, APPELLEES
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The court reversed a final judgment because a successor judge signed the judgment without having heard the evidence or participated in the trial. The case establishes that a successor judge cannot enter a final judgment based on evidence heard by a predecessor judge, even if the predecessor prepared a letter ruling.
A successor judge may not enter an order or judgment based upon evidence heard by the predecessor judge. The rule applies even where the predecessor judge has reduced the proposed judgment to writing, as the judgment is not rendered until it is signed by the trial judge who heard the case.
[1] A successor judge may not enter an order or judgment based upon evidence heard by the predecessor judge.
[2] A successor judge may not sign and file a final judgment, even if prepared by the predecessor judge, without hearing the evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[A] successor judge may not enter an order or judgment based upon evidence heard by the predecessor judge.”
Establishes the core rule preventing successor judges from entering judgments without hearing evidence
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSenior Circuit Judge William Anderson conducted a non-jury trial. Several weeks after the trial, Judge Anderson wrote a letter to counsel proposing sp…
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KAHN, J.
This appeal turns on its undisputed procedural facts. The final judgment here was signed by a successor trial judge, although the. predecessor judge had prepared a letter ruling and submitted it to counsel. The judgment makes specific findings concerning the reliability of a property appraisal. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Senior Circuit Judge William Anderson heard this matter in a non-jury trial. Several weeks later, Judge Anderson wrote a letter to counsel advising that he proposed to make several findings that would result in a judgment for appellees, defendants below. Judge Anderson asked the defendants’ lawyer to prepare an appropriate judgment. Several weeks later such a judgment was actually executed by Circuit Judge Thomas Remington who had not participated in any aspect of the earlier proceedings and had not heard any of the evidence. Appellants immediately moved for rehearing expressly objecting because the final judgment had not been signed by the judge who presided over the trial. During the pendency of this motion, Judge Anderson passed away. Shortly thereafter, Judge Remington heard and denied the motion for rehearing.
“[A] successor judge may not enter an order or judgment based upon evidence heard by the predecessor judge.” Carr v. Byers, 578 So. 2d 347, 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Even where the proposed judgment has been reduced to writing by the predecessor judge, the successor judge may not sign and file the proposed final judgment without hearing the evidence. See id. We acknowledge that Judge Anderson prepared a letter ruling in this ease. It is nevertheless undisputed that Judge Anderson never signed an order or a judgment. We adhere to the rule that “until rendered, the decision of a trial judge is not a judgment....” Id. In a much earlier case, the Third District held that a successor judge could properly sign a decree that had been dictated by the predecessor on the day before the predecessor’s term of office expired. See Olympic Mfg. Co. v. Shepherd, 190 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966).
This exception to the general rule, if it survives at all, is very narrow. As the Third District stated soon after the Olympic decision, “[W]e express the reservation that the [Olympic ] decision reaches the extreme length to which the exceptions to the general rule can be pressed.” Silvern v. Silvern, 252 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971).
Here, the final judgment was based upon disputed evidence. Although the judge who heard the case prepared a letter ruling, he never even saw the ultimate final judgment and certainly never rendered such a judgment. Accordingly, this matter must be REVERSED and REMANDED for a-new trial.
PADOVANO and POLSTON, JJ., concur.
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Nowlin v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 193 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…nt, The entry of a final judgment by a judge who did not preside over the trial, without more, is improper. “[A] successor judge may not enter an order or judgment based upon evidence heard by the predecessor judge.” Hartney v. Piedmont Tech., Inc., 814 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (quoting Carr v. Byers, 578 So. 2d 347, 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)); see also Acker v. State, 823 So. 2d 875, 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (reversing probation order where judge who signed the order did not hear the testimony of the…
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Fratello v. State, 950 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…n of the parties. See, e.g., Acker v. State, 823 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that successor judge who did not hear witness testimony or rule on credibility could not sign written order revoking probation); Hartney v. Piedmont Tech., Inc., 814 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that successor judge who did not preside at trial or hear evidence could not enter final judgment). See also E.J. v. Dep’t. of Children and Families, 795 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Tompkins Land and Hous., Inc. v.…
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Willis v. State, 823 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…uld have been scored as a Level 7, rather than Level 9, offense; and that the error was not harmless, in that Holt’s current sentence could not have been imposed under the 1994 guidelines without a departure. Id. at 292; see also Chatfield v. State, 814 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). For the reasons underlying our Holt and Chatfield decisions, we reverse and remand for re-sentencing scoring the primary offense as a Level 7 offense pursuant to the 1994 guidelines. REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions. AL…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Silvern v. Silvern, 252 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Carr v. Byers, 578 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Olympic Mfg. Co. v. Shepherd, 190 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)