MYRICK EGGLESTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Myrick Eggleston appeals his convictions for burglary, dealing in stolen property, and grand theft. The court reversed his convictions, holding that the trial court violated his Faretta right to self-representation by examining his competency to perform as counsel rather than his competency to waive counsel, and that one of two dealing in stolen property counts violated double jeopardy.
The trial court erred in denying Eggleston's right to represent himself because once a defendant is determined competent to knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel, the inquiry is complete and the defendant cannot be denied self-representation based on incompetency to perform as counsel. Additionally, one of the two dealing in stolen property counts must be dismissed on double jeopardy grounds because both counts arose from the same burglary with items pawned simultaneously on the same receipt.
[1] A defendant's right to self-representation under Faretta v. …
[2] The determination of a defendant's competency to waive the right to counsel is distinct from the determination of a defendant's competency to represent himself.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under Faretta, the critical determination is whether the defendant is competent to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. See State v. Bowen, 698 So.2d 248, 251 (Fla.1997). Once that determination is made, the inquiry is over. Whether the defendant can competently represent himself or herself is simply not part of the test.”
Establishes the legal standard that competency to waive counsel is distinct from competency to perform as counsel
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEggleston was charged with burglary, two counts of dealing in stolen property, and grand theft. On the morning of trial, he expressed a desire to repr…
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BLUE, Chief Judge.
Myrick Eggleston appeals his convictions and sentences for burglary, two counts of dealing in stolen property, and grand theft. We agree with Mr. Eggle-ston’s contention that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court improperly denied him the right to represent himself contrary to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 96 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Mr. Eggleston also correctly identifies a double jeopardy violation with the two counts of dealing in stolen property. We reject without discussion the remaining issues raised.
Mr. Eggleston was a difficult defendant who challenged the criminal justice system. He simply did not want to deal with his charges: he neither wanted to plead guilty nor proceed to trial. The critical error in this case occurred the morning of the trial when Mr. Eggleston expressed a desire to represent himself. The trial judge conducted a Faretta hearing, determined that Mr. Eggleston was competent to waive his right to counsel, and properly allowed Mr. Eggleston to proceed pro se.
The judge then attempted to move the case toward trial and Mr. Eggleston balked, insisting that he did not want a trial. After lengthy exchanges, the judge announced that Mr. Eggleston was not competent to represent himself and reappointed counsel. The trial commenced and Mr. Eggleston was convicted as charged.
Under Faretta, the critical determination is whether the defendant is competent to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. See State v. Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248, 251 (Fla.1997). Once that determination is made, the inquiry is over. Whether the defendant can competently represent himself or herself is simply not part of the test. See Hill v. State, 688 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla.1996). There is no harmless error analysis available for this error. A criminal defendant who is competent to choose self-representation may not be denied that choice, even though the decision for self-representation will most certainly result in incompetent trial counsel. The trial court must determine the defendant’s competency to decide on self-representation, not the competency to perform when self-represented. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Mr. Eggle-ston’s right to represent himself at trial, and the convictions must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
As to the two counts of dealing in stolen property, one count must be dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. The two counts reflect two separate items that were taken in the same residential burglary. The items were pawned at the same time, on the same pawn receipt. There simply is no basis to support two charges. See Barnlund v. State, 724 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
Convictions reversed and remanded for a new trial on the charges of burglary, one count of dealing in stolen property, and grand theft.
ALTENBERND and STRINGER, JJ., Concur.
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Wheeler v. State, 839 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Thus, “a criminal defendant who is competent to choose self-representation may not be denied that choice, even though the decision for self-representation will most certainly result in incompetent trial counsel.” Eggleston v. State, 812 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). There are no “magic words” in a Faretta inquiry. Rather, we look to the defendant’s general understanding of her rights as codified in rule 3.111(d), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. As to Wheeler’s first point, we reco…
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Williams v. State, 163 So. 3d 694 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…f his particular case. “A criminal defendant who is competent to choose self-representation may not be denied that choice, even though the decision for self-representation will most certainly result in incompetent trial counsel.” Eggleston v. State, 812 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Though a trial judge may be tempted to rescue a defendant from representing himself and having a fool for a client, the court’s proper role is to provide protection to the unwary, not the foolhardy; to protect the unwitting,…
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Tarver v. State, 145 So. 3d 911 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…1253, 1256-57 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). The standard is whether a defendant is competent to waive his right to counsel, not whether he is competent to represent himself. Fleck v. State, 956 So. 2d 548, 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); see also Eggleston v. State, 812 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“A criminal defendant who is competent to choose self-representation may not be denied that choice, even though the decision for self-representation will most certainly result in incompetent trial counsel.”). There is no har…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- State v. Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1997)
- Hill v. State, 688 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1996)
- Maury Barnlund v. State, 724 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)