MARGARET V. RICHARDSON AND MARK E. RICHARDSON, APPELLANTS,
v.
ROSELLA A. TURNER, APPELLEE
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The Richardsons obtained a judgment for specific performance requiring Turner to convey real property in exchange for $167,000 plus 10% interest from December 1, 1999. When Turner refused to close and obtained a stay pending appeal, the trial court later awarded her postjudgment interest accruing through February 28, 2001. The appellate court reversed, holding that interest should have stopped accruing on February 25, 2000, when the Richardsons were ready to close but Turner refused to attend.
No. Where a plaintiff effectively tenders fulfillment of its obligation by being ready and willing to close, but the defendant refuses to attend, the accrual of postjudgment interest should stop on the date of the attempted closing, not continue through a later closing date imposed during or after the stay.
[1] A stay of a judgment pending appeal also stays the accrual of postjudgment interest when the party seeking specific performance has tendered fulfillment of their obligati…
[2] When a party seeking specific performance is ready, willing, and able to close on the date set for closing, and the other party's refusal to attend prevents the closing,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is undisputed that the Richardsons were present and ready to close the sale. But for Turner's refusal to attend the closing, the property transfer would have been completed on February 25, 2000.”
Establishes that the Richardsons tendered performance and the only impediment was Turner's refusal to attend
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Richardsons obtained a judgment awarding them specific performance to compel Turner to convey real property for $167,000 plus 10% interest from De…
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FULMER, Judge.
Margaret V. Richardson and Mark E. Richardson appeal from an order granting postjudgment interest to the Appellee, Rosella A. Turner. We reverse.
The Richardsons sued for specific performance to compel Turner to convey real property to them. After a trial, the Rich-ardsons were awarded a specific performance judgment in which the trial court ordered Turner to convey the property to the Richardsons in exchange for $167,000, “plus interest at the legal rate of 10% from December 1, 1999,” the date of the jury verdict. When the Richardsons attempted to close the sale, however, Turner refused to attend the closing and, instead, moved for and was granted a stay of the judgment pending her appeal to this court. After the final judgment was affirmed, the Richardsons filed a motion to set a closing date and determine final payment for completion of the sale.
At the hearing on the Richardsons’ motion, Turner’s counsel presented a final payment calculation that included interest from December 1, 1999, to February 28, 2001, the date set by the trial court for the closing. In response, the Richardsons’ counsel directed the trial court’s attention to the fact that the Richardsons were prepared to close the transaction prior to the appeal, but Turner refused to attend the closing. A transcript of the events that transpired on the original closing date, February 25, 2000, had been filed with the trial court. It is undisputed that the Rich-ardsons were present and ready to close the sale. But for Turner’s refusal to attend the closing, the property transfer would have been completed on February 25, 2000. The Richardsons’ counsel argued that under these circumstances, the stay of the judgment pending the appeal also should have stayed the interest provision in the judgment.
We agree. On the record before us, we conclude that the Richardsons effectively tendered fulfillment of their obligation to deliver payment in exchange for a deed as required by the final judgment.
Therefore, the accrual of interest stopped on February 25, 2000. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
WHATLEY and STRINGER, JJ., Concur.
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Futernick v. Trushina, 207 So. 3d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…We also hold that the trial court did not err in its determination that Futernick and Beber were not entitled to post-judgment interest at the then—statutory rate of 4.75%.2 We agree with the analysis of the Second District in Richardson v. Turner, 810 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) and conclude that Richardson is fully applicable to the circumstances presented by this case. Affirmed. . The central argument advanced by Futer-nick and Beber in this regard is that, during the original trial, Trushina never pr…