NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
RLI INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
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New Hampshire Insurance Company appeals a partial summary judgment finding that three shooting incidents constitute three separate 'occurrences' under its insurance policy rather than a single occurrence. The court affirms, holding that three separate acts of shooting causing injuries to three separate persons constitute three distinct occurrences.
The court held that there were three separate occurrences. The three distinct acts of shooting, each causing separate injuries to separate persons at separate times, constitute three separate occurrences rather than one continuous occurrence.
[1] An "occurrence" under an insurance policy is defined by the act which causes the damage, not by the resulting injuries.
[2] Separate acts of shooting, occurring at separate times and causing separate injuries to separate persons, constitute multiple "occurrences" for insurance coverage purpose…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The act which causes the damage constitutes the occurrence.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for determining what constitutes a single occurrence under insurance policy terms.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn aggressor fired three separate shots at different times, injuring three separate persons and killing two of them. The dispute centers on whether th…
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SHEVIN, Judge.
New Hampshire Insurance Company appeals an “Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment Limited to the Issue of Coverage Available.” We affirm.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the incidents which gave rise to this litigation constitute one occurrence, or multiple occurrences, as that term is defined in New Hampshire’s policy.1 Ml Lability issues have been resolved already by settlement. As the trial court properly found, there were three “occurrences” here. The aggressor fired three shots, at separate times, and injured three separate persons, killing two. “The act which causes the damage constitutes the occurrence.” Phillips v. Ostrer, 481 So. 2d 1241, 1247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). There were three separate acts of shooting, causing three separate injuries to three separate persons in three separate instances. This is not a case with one proximate, uninterrupted continuing cause resulting in the deaths and injuries, but rather three separate causes. Here, as in American Indemnity Co. v. McQuaig, 435 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), New Hampshire did not incur any liability because of the aggressor’s residence, but rather liability attached when the aggressor fired three shots which resulted in injury to the three victims. Hence, the trial court correctly ruled that three separate “occurrences” had transpired for which New Hampshire was liable.
We certify this issue to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance in view of its consideration of Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 240 F. 3d 1331 (11th Cir.2001), review granted, Case No. SC01-301 (oral argument Nov. 8, 2001).
Affirmed.
JORGENSON and SHEVIN, JJ„ concur. . " 'Occurrence’ means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.”
LEVY, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The majority’s reliance on American Indemnity Co. v. McQuaig, 435 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), is misplaced because McQuaig is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. In McQuaig, the insured party was the homeowner whose wrongful acts consisted of firing three shots at the officers who responded to the incident at his residence. See McQuaig, 435 So. 2d at 414-15. In the instant case, however, the insured party is the condominium complex whose wrongful act, if any, consisted of permitting Mr. Ahem to reside in the complex. As stated by the majority, “[t]he act which causes the damage constitutes the occurrence.” Phillips v. Ostrer, 481 So. 2d 1241, 1247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Here, the “occurrence” is the condominium complex’s single act of permitting Mr. Ahern to reside there. Thus, the trial court erred in ruling that three separate “occurrences” had transpired for which New Hampshire was liable.
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Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2003)…d for negligent failure to provide security and the shooter is a third party who directly causes the injuries to the victims. This approach is consistent with the Third District’s recent decision in New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. RLI Insurance Co., 807 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), notice invoking discretionary jurisdiction filed, No. SC02-460 (Fla. Feb. 26, 2002). In RLI, the aggressor fired three shots at separate times and places within the apartment complex and injured three separate persons, killing tw…1 / 2
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Lincoln Ins. Co. v. Home Emergency Servs., Inc., 812 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…ether coverage should be afforded under an insurance policy, it is important to first consider who the insured party is and what the claim is against the insured party for which coverage is sought. See, e.g., Neiv Hampshire Ins. Co. v. RLI Ins. Co., 807 So. 2d 171, 171 (Fla. 3d DCA, 2002)(Levy, J., dissenting)(quoting Phillips v. Ostrer, 481 So. 2d 1241, 1247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985))(“[t]he act which causes the damage constitutes the occurrence.”). Here, the insured party is HES and the claim against it is for spo…
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Maddox v. Fla. Farm Bureau Gen., 129 So. 3d 1179 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)…njury-producing act and not the underlying tortious omission. Id. Consequently, “[t]he act which causes the damage constitutes the occurrence.” Phillips v. Ostrer, 481 So. 2d 1241, 1247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. RLI Ins. Co., 807 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). In Koikos, the gunshots, not the negligent security, directly caused the injury to the plaintiffs. Likewise, in McQuaig, the immediate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries were the gunshots, not the shooter’s insanity. Similarly h…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Phillips v. Ostrer, 481 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Am. Indem. Co. v. McQUAIG, 435 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Koikos v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2001)