TOMMY BARDO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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In this criminal appeal, the court held that a trial judge lacks statutory authority to order the Department of Corrections to provide evaluation and treatment for sexual offenders pursuant to Florida's sexually violent predator commitment statutes. The defendant's request for such evaluation and treatment at sentencing was properly denied because the statutory scheme vests that authority exclusively in other state agencies.
The trial judge correctly denied the defendant's request for evaluation and treatment. A sentencing judge lacks statutory authority to activate the provisions of sections 394.910 et seq., as the detailed statutory scheme for involuntary commitment of sexually violent predators devolves these powers and duties exclusively to other designated persons and agencies, not the original sentencing judge.
[1] A sentencing judge is not authorized to order evaluation and treatment for a defendant under Florida's sexually violent predator statutes.
[2] The statutory scheme for the involuntary commitment of sexually violent predators vests authority in specific agencies and officials, not the sentencing judge.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Our review of the legislation reveals nothing to suggest that a judge who sentences a defendant for the underlying sexual offense is authorized to activate the provisions of sections 394.910, et seq.”
Establishes the core holding that sentencing judges lack statutory authority over the involuntary commitment evaluation and treatment procedures.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant Bardo entered a guilty plea to attempted capital sexual battery. At sentencing, Bardo filed a motion requesting that the trial judge order t…
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PER CURIAM.
The issue in this criminal case is whether a trial judge must, if requested at the time of sentencing, order the Department of Corrections to provide a defendant with evaluation and treatment pursuant to sections 394.910-.931, Florida Statutes (2000). In this case, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of attempted capital sexual battery. At sentencing, the defendant filed a motion requesting evaluation and treatment, which was denied by the sentencing judge after hearing argument of counsel. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment, followed by a period of sex offender probation. We hold that the sentencing judge correctly denied appellant’s request for evaluation and treatment.
The Florida Legislature has established a detailed procedure for the involuntary commitment of certain sexually violent predators. In particular, the legislation requires a written assessment of certain incarcerated prisoners to determine whether they meet the definition of sexually violent predators. See § 394.913, Fla. Stat. (2000).
The legislation anticipates that the written assessment will be compiled by the Florida Department of Children and Family Services and forwarded to the State Attorney’s Office. See § 394.913(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (2000).
The State Attorney’s Office may then institute a proceeding before a circuit judge for the purpose of determining whether a person should be declared a sexually violent predator. See § 394.914, Fla. Stat. (2000).
The legislation provides that this proceeding, if it seeks civil commitment, will culminate with a trial, by jury if so requested. See § 394.916, Fla. Stat. (2000).
Our review of the legislation reveals nothing to suggest that a judge who sentences a defendant for the underlying sexual offense is authorized to activate the provisions of sections 394.910, et seq. See §§ 394.910-931, Fla. Stat. (2000).
In fact, the legislation specifically devolves powers and duties to those persons and agencies authorized to give notice that a convict is a potentially sexually violent predator, as well as to those authorized to act upon such notice. See § 394.913, Fla. Stat. (2000).
The statutory scheme does not contemplate any role for the original sentencing judge. We further note that the order that appellant sought in this case would have required the trial judge to assert control over both the Department of Corrections and the Department of Children and Family Services. Such an assertion of control in the context of sentencing would have been impermissible, and the trial judge obviously recognized this. See Dep’t of Juv. Just. v. J.R., 716 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); see also Singletary v. Acosta, 659 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995).
Accordingly, the judge committed no error in refusing to order evaluation and treatment.
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN, KAHN, and DAVIS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Howard v. State, 659 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Singletary v. Acosta, 659 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- King v. King, 716 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Dep't OF Juv. Just. v. J.R., 716 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)