CHERYL HOLLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY OF DESTIN, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, TRAVIS SANDERS, INDIVIDUALLY, DENNIS WILFONG, INDIVIDUALLY, AND RICHARD STEVENS, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES
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An employee sued her employer for false imprisonment, assault and battery, and whistleblower retaliation. The trial court dismissed the whistleblower claim as untimely and granted summary judgment on the other counts. The appellate court reversed, holding that the whistleblower claim related back to the original complaint under Florida's relation back doctrine and that genuine issues of material fact existed for the assault and battery and false imprisonment claims.
The whistleblower claim related back to the original complaint under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(c) because it arose out of the same conduct as allegations in the original complaint, and amendments changing the legal theory relating back are permitted even after the statute of limitations has run. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the false imprisonment and assault and battery counts because genuine issues of material fact existed that must be resolved by a jury.
[1] A Whistleblower's Act claim is timely if filed within two years of discovering the retaliatory action or four years of the action itself, unless the claim relates back to…
[2] An amended complaint relates back to the original complaint if the claim asserted in the amendment arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the o…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an amendment which merely makes more specific what has already been alleged generally, or which changes the legal theory of the action, will relate back even though the statute of limitations has run in the interim”
Establishes that the whistleblower claim could relate back to the original complaint even though the statute of limitations had run.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCheryl Holley sued her employer, Innovative Technology of Destin, Inc., and three individual defendants for false imprisonment, assault and battery, a…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant filed suit against Appellees, her employer and three individuals alleging false imprisonment (count 2), assault and battery (count 3), and violation of section 448.102, Florida Statutes (count 7) (“Whistleblower’s Act”).1 Appellees moved to dismiss numerous counts of the second amended complaint, including count 7, and Appellees Innovative Technology, Sanders, and Stevens moved for judgment on the pleadings as to count 7. The trial court dismissed count 7 with prejudice and entered judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the claim was untimely filed, stated a new cause of action, and did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint.2
Appellant’s Whistleblower’s claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Section 448.103(l)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that an employee subjected to retaliatory personnel action in violation of this statute may bring a civil action within the earlier of (a) two years after discovering the retaliatory personnel action or (b) four years after the personnel action was taken. Id. However, if the Whistleblower’s claim asserted in the second amended complaint “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original [complaint], the amendment shall relate back to the date of the original [verified complaint].” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c). The relation back doctrine should be liberally applied. See Ron’s Quality Towing, Inc. v. Southeastern Bank of Florida, 765 So. 2d 134, 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)(citing Schwartz ex rel. Schwartz v. Wilt Chamberlain’s of Boca Raton, Ltd., 725 So. 2d 451, 454 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); R.A Jones & Sons, Inc. v. Holman, 470 So. 2d 60, 66 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rev. dismissed sub nom. Ford Motor. Co. v. R.A. Jones & Sons, Inc., 482 So. 2d 348 (Fla.1986)).
The Whistleblower’s claim is virtually identical to a count of the original verified complaint. “[A]n amendment which merely makes more specific what has already been alleged generally, or which changes the legal theory of the action, will relate back even though the statute of limitations has run in the interim.” Kiehl v. Brown, 546 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (citing Keel v. Brown, 162 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964), cert. denied, 166 So. 2d 753 (Fla.1964) (quoting J. Moore, A. Vestal & P. Kurland, Moore’s Manual Federal Practice & Procedure § 9.09 (2d ed.1988))), rev. denied, 557 So. 2d 35 (Fla.1990). Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing count 7 and granting judgment on the pleadings as to this count.
Additionally, the trial court granted Ap-pellees’ motions for summary judgment as to counts 2 and 3. Review of the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellant reveals genuine issues of material fact, which must be resolved by a jury. We reverse the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment as to the assault and battery and false imprisonment counts. We affirm as to the remaining issues.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for the trial court to reinstate counts 2, 3, and 7 of the second amended complaint.
BOOTH and BROWNING, JJ., concur; BENTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
. Appellant also alleged other counts not relevant to the issues requiring reversal.
. The trial court was required to accept as true all allegations of the complaint and was limited to considering the four corners of the complaint for purposes of the motion to dismiss. See Anderson v. Emro Mktg. Co., 550 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(citing Chaires v. North Florida Nat’l Bank, 432 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)). In ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court was required to accept the allegations of the party opposing the motion as true, and to treat as false the mov-ant’s allegations that were denied. See Forbes v. Gimbel, 539 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (citing City of Miami v. J.C. Vereen & Sons, Inc., 359 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Wagner v. Wagner, 196 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)).
BENTON, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I would affirm summary judgment on count two, which alleged false imprisonment during a car ride, because the plaintiff admittedly got in the car voluntarily and disembarked at her destination without impediment. Otherwise, I join the opinion of the court.
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Dausman v. Hillsborough Area Reg'l Transit, 898 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…merely changed the legal theory of the action. “ ‘[A]n amendment which merely ... changes the legal theory of the action, will relate back even though the statute of limitations has run in the interim.’ ” Holley v. Innovative Tech. of Destin, Inc., 803 So. 2d 749, 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (quoting Kiehl v. Brown, 546 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)). See Fla. R. Civ. P. I.190(c) (“Relation back of amendments. When the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or…
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Sealy v. Perdido KEY Oyster BAR & Marina, LLC, 88 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…t reversibly erred because when ruling on such a motion, a court must accept as true the allegations of the party opposing the motion, and treat as false all allegations of the movant that were denied. See Holley v. Innovative Tech. of Destin, Inc., 803 So. 2d 749, 750 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); accord Cuccarini v. Rosenfeld, 76 So. 3d 328, 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). Although Appellant denied Appel-lee’s affirmative defenses, the trial court failed to consider the relevant allegations false. Instead, the court pe…
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Herrera v. Jarden Corp., 334 So. 3d 637 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)…which merely makes more specific what has already been alleged generally, or which changes the legal theory of the action, will relate back even though the statute of limitations has run in the interim.” Holley v. Innovative Tech. of Destin, Inc., 803 So. 2d 749, 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (quoting Kiehl v. Brown, 546 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)). “The relation back doctrine should be liberally applied.” Id. “[T]he proper test of relation back of amendments is not whether the cause of action stated in…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- R.A. Jones & Sons, Inc. v. Holman, 470 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Keel v. Brown, 162 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Otto B. Kiehl and James H. Smith v. Brown, 546 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Schwartz v. Wilt Chamberlain's OF Boca Raton, Ltd., 725 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Chaires v. N. Fla. Nat'l Bank, 432 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Wagner v. Wagner, 196 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)
- City OF Miami v. J. C. Vereen & Sons, Inc., 359 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Ron's Quality Towing, Inc. v. Se. Bank OF Fla. & Floyd Pridgeon, 765 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Anderson v. Emro Mktg. Co., 550 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Deringer v. Pappas, 166 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1964)