T. J. MCQUAIG AND ANNA I. MCQUAIG, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE SEABOARD OIL COMPANY, A CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF OHIO, AND OCALA SALES COMPANY, A CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The McQuaigs appealed an injunction issued by a trial court preventing them from breaching an exclusive petroleum supply contract with Seaboard Oil Company. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the injunction, holding that the exclusive dealing contract was not an illegal restraint of trade and that equity jurisdiction was appropriate for enforcement.
The court held that the contract does not constitute an illegal restraint of trade because it does not attempt to limit production, control the market, or fix prices, is reasonable in its terms, and is limited as to time, space, and extent. The court also held that equity jurisdiction was the proper forum and that Seaboard had a right to injunctive relief.
“We think that the contract here involved falls far short of embracing the elements necessary to hold it void as being in restraint of trade. It in no wise attempts to limit production or control or to fix the price in the market of the commodities embraced in it.”
Establishes that exclusive dealing contracts are not per se illegal restraints of trade if they do not limit production or control pricing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn September 1925, the McQuaigs and Seaboard Oil Company contracted for Seaboard to build and equip a filling station on the McQuaigs' land near Ocala…
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Per Curiam.
In September, 1925, .appellants and the Seaboard Oil Company entered into a certain contract, the salient features of which were that the Seaboard Oil Company agreed to build and equip a filling station on appellants’ lands located on the Silver Springs road near Ocala, Florida, and to sell them (appellants) petroleum products atl lowest dealers market prices for distribution in the territory where said filling station was located. The appellants agreed to use Seaboard Oil Company’s petroleum products exclusively for ten years in the station so constructed and to sign the usual agreement for that purpose.
In June, 1927, appellants entered into a contract with Ocala Sales Company to lease the said filling station and lot on which the same is located for a period of seven months, at a monthly rental of One Hundred and Fifty ($150.00) Dollars. In January, 1928, The Seaboard Oil Company filed its bill to restrain appellants or its agents from using the said filling station for any other use than the exclusive sale of its petroleum products as contemplated in the contract of September, 1925, as here referred to. A temporary restraining order was granted and a demurrer to the bill was filed. From an order overruling the .demurrer and an order refusing to quash the temporary restraining order appeal was taken to this Court.
It is -urged here that the contract of September, 1925, is void as being in restraint of trade, that the Seaboard Oil Company had an adequate remedy at law, that the said contract was one requiring continuous performance which could not be enforced, that the contract was lacking in mutuality and that no right of injunctive relief was shown.
We think that the contract here involved falls far short of embracing the elements necessary to hold it void as being in restraint of trade. It in no wise attempts to limit production or control or to fix the price in the market of the commodities embraced in it. It is reasonable in its terms and limited as to time, space and extent of trade. So far as we have been able to find no contract has been declared void in restraint of trade when so constructed. Lee v. Clearwater Growers Ass’n 93 Fla. 214, 11 So. R. 722, and cases cited.
Other assignments have been examined but are found to be without ample support'in the record. We think that on tbe showing made the Seaboard Oil Company had a right to the relief sought and that a, court of equity was the proper forum in which to seek such relief. The decree of the chancellor is, therefore, affirmed.
Affirmed.
Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur. Ellis, C. J., and Strum and Brown, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
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City GAS Co. v. Peoples GAS Sys., Inc., 182 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1965)…unreasonable, restrictions upon free competition. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1910); Lee v. Clearwater Growers' Ass’n, 93 Fla. 214, 111 So. 722 (1927); McQuaig v. Seaboard Oil Co. et al., 96 Fla. 275, 118 So. 424 (1928); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Williams Elec. Coop., 263 F. 2d 431 (C.A. 8th 1959). Thus, such statutes are not directed against monopoly per se, but rather against the evils that led to their enactment. As Chief Justice White…
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Gen. Tire OF Miami, Inc. v. Aeroland OIL Co., 132 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)…early that the exclusive agreement is to be in effect in only one store, and that the agreement does not limit production, or control prices. We think that the agreement is valid and is not in restraint of trade. See McQuaig v. Seaboard Oil Company, 96 Fla. 275, 118 So. 424. Accordingly, the injunctive order is modified by striking the word “tires” from the paragraph before the last thereof and the addition of the following sentence to that paragraph: “The defendant is not enjoined from handling General T…
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Ireland v. Craggs, 56 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1932)…r as they are not prohibited by law,” Newsom v. Acacia Mut. Life Ass’n (Fa.) 136 So. 389, 392; that, provided they are willing to pay the piper, they may call their own tune, Massari v. Salciccia (Fla.) 136 So. 522, 523; McQuaig v. Seaboard Oil Co., 96 Fla. 275, 118 So. 424. It is the rule generally that, where one tardily ascertaining, after he has had the fruits of a contract, that his agreement was illegal, invokes the public interest “the interest of others than the parties,” Beasley v. T. & P. R. R.,…
Authorities Cited
- Lee v. Clearwater Growers Ass'n, 93 Fla. 214 (Fla. 1927)