STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., PETITIONER,
v.
GARY PARRISH, ETC. ET AL, RESPONDENTS

Fla. 5th DCA | 2001-11-30
No. 5D01-2292
COBB and PETERSON, JJ„ concur.
800 So. 2d 706 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2001) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

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Synopsis

State Farm challenged a trial court's discovery order requiring production of voluminous materials about how it handled stacking coverage selection options. The appellate court held that the discovery request constituted an improper fishing expedition unrelated to the issues in the pleadings and violated the scope of permissible discovery under Florida Rule 1.280(b)(1).


Holding

Certiorari is granted and the discovery order is quashed. A trial court may not authorize a fishing expedition into documents unrelated to the present controversy merely because they might possibly lead to evidence supporting some subsequent cause of action. Discovery must be limited to matters relevant to the subject matter of the pending action as written in Rule 1.280(b)(1).


Headnotes

[1] Certiorari is available to quash a discovery order that permits discovery unrelated to the issues raised by the pleadings.

[2] A trial court errs by authorizing a "fishing expedition" for potential, unstated causes of action beyond the scope of the pending action.

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Key Quotes

“certiorari was available and should be used to quash an order "to the extent that it permitt[ed] discovery even when it has been affirmatively established that such discovery is neither relevant nor will lead to discovery of relevant information."”

Establishes the standard from Allstate Insurance Co. v. Langston for when certiorari is available to challenge discovery orders.

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Facts & Procedural History

Gary and Joellen Parrish sued State Farm seeking stacking of uninsured motorist coverage across two policies. State Farm defended based on Parrish's p…

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Opinion of the Court
HARRIS, J.

HARRIS, J.

Gary and Joellen Parrish (“Parrish”) sued State Farm as their uninsured motorist carrier. Since there were two policies involved, Parrish claimed that the policy coverage for each policy should be stacked. State Farm defended on the basis that Parrish had specifically selected and paid for nonstacking coverage. That was the state of the pleadings when Parrish requested the production of voluminous material seeking information relative to how the selection process concerning the stacking coverage option was handled by State Farm, apparently to see if there was any basis to avoid the consequence of Parrish’s previous selection. When the trial court ordered the production, State Farm filed its certiorari petition urging that the discovery request was not only unduly burdensome and overbroad, but also constituted a fishing expedition unrelated to the issues raised by the pleadings.

In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 95 (Fla.1995), the supreme court held that certiorari was available and should be used to quash an order “to the extent that it permitt[ed] discovery even when it has been affirmatively established that such discovery is neither relevant nor will lead to discovery of relevant information.” Id. at 95. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Boecher, 733 So. 2d 993 (Fla.1999), the supreme court again discussed Langston and, without expressly overruling it, stated that the principle announced in Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097 (Fla.1987) (irreparable injury), remains the appropriate standard in considering the grant of certiorari relief in pretrial discovery.

In this case, when the trial court granted the production, it acknowledged that the requested discovery was irrelevant to any pleadings before the court. Thus the Langston criteria, to the extent it remains applicable, was met. But the judge went further: “I think that a prudent lawyer, you know, has to — is entitled to do a little fishing around the number of the complaint on related issues that might give rise to a cause of action, if there is a potential cause of action out there. So, you know, I believe that if you want to call it fishing, I think a little fishing is appropriate and even prudent and warranted.”

Thus, the error for which certiorari is here requested does not involve a mere alleged judicial error concerning the relevancy of the requested material to the issues before the court; it is an error of law by which the judge himself has expanded the parameters of rule 1.280(b)(1), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, from permitting discovery of matters “relevant to the subject matter of the pending action” to authorizing a fishing expedition which “might give rise to a potential cause of action.” We believe that having to defend against a potential, unstated cause of action while at the same time having to defend against the action properly before the court is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant certiorari. Further, effective review is necessary to assure compliance with the discovery rule as written.

CERTIORARI is granted and the order to produce documents unrelated to the present controversy but which might possibly lead to evidence supporting some subsequent cause of action is quashed.

COBB and PETERSON, JJ„ concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hess, 814 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
    …hat interrogatory in nursing home litigation which requested names and addresses of residents and former residents of nursing home who were not parties to action was overbroad, and order compelling such discovery was quashed); State Farm v. Parrish, 800 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)(holding that certiorari was available to quash order permitting discovery which was a fishing expedition to discover any other facts which may give rise to a potential cause of action). In closing, we reject Nationwide’s claim t…
  • Matthews v. City OF Maitland, 923 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
    …nts of law; whether competent, substantial evidence supported the approval; and whether the City had unbridled discretion to approve the development agreement. Petitioners point out that in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Parrish, 800 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), this court explained that- certiorari is available to quash a discovery order when it is affirmatively established that such| discovery is neither relevant nor likely to lead to relevant information, provided that the order caus…
  • B&T Med. Ctr. v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co. (9th Cir. Ct. App. Div. 2007)
    …depositions will not result in the prejudice of “having to defend against a potential, unstated cause of action while at the same time having to defend against the action properly before the court . . . .” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Parrish, 800 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). c. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Petitioner’s Motion to Stay Petitioner’s final argument is that the trial court erred in denying its Motion to Stay the taking of the depositions. A trial court has broad discretio…

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