TYJUAN WILBERT JOHNSON, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

PLEUS, J.

Tyjuan Johnson filed a Motion for Clarification asking this court to explain the statement contained in its opinion that he abandoned his right to privacy argument. This court reached that conclusion because, even if his Initial and Reply Briefs can, in any manner, be construed to have raised the issue, the argument was not developed. The Committee Notes to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.210 pertaining to Briefs provide the following:

... The abolition of assignments of error requires that counsel be vigilant in specifying for the court the errors committed; that greater attention be given the formulation of questions presented; and that counsel comply with subdivision (b)(5) by setting forth the precise relief sought....

[Emphasis supplied]. This court does not read minds. The relief sought on appeal in this case is “an individualized hearing to evaluate the need and suitability for sexual offender designation and notification provisions.” As this court reads Johnson’s Initial and Reply Briefs, the argument contained therein was directed at providing support for the requested relief. If Johnson intended to raise a right to privacy argument, it was unclear. This court would caution litigants to develop those arguments which they wish considered and reviewed. Regardless of whether Johnson raised a right to privacy argument, the overall result in this case remains unchanged. We grant the motion for clarification and reaffirm our adoption of the written opinion of Judge Shawn L. Briese as the opinion of this court.

MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION GRANTED.

THOMPSON, C.J., and COBB, J., concur. . The trial court granted the state's motion to strike that portion of the motion challenging the constitutionality of the Sexual Predator Act for lack of standing.

. Johnson has abandoned this latter argument on appeal,

. State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 409 (1998), 700 N.E. 2d 570.

. Doe opined "the Commonwealth sought to demonstrate that there are high recidivism rates for all of the subcategories of offenders who have engaged in one of the various conducts that supports conviction under G.L. c. 265, § 23.” It is not clear, for example, that the Commonwealth's use of the term "child molester” refers to an individual adjudicated delinquent by reason of G.L. c. 265, § 23, based on sexual experimentation with an underage peer. Because we can envision situations, some of which we have suggested, where the risk of reoffense by one convicted under G.L. c. 265 § 23, may be minimal and the present danger of that person to children not significant, the general legislative category does not adequately specify offenders by risk so as to warrant automatic registration of every person convicted under that statute. Doe, 430 Mass. 155, 715 N.E. 2d 37.

. See Fraternal Order of Police, 812 F. 2d at 117 (holding that "arrest records are not entitled to privacy protection” because they are public); Cline v, Rogers, 87 F. 3d 176, 179 (6th Cir.) (holding that "there is no constitutional right to privacy in one’s criminal record” because "arrest and conviction information are matters of public record”).

. The Florida Supreme Court has previously held that the sexual predator designation and corresponding requirements do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy, nor do they violate the ex post facto clause. See Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) ([Registration requirements imposed on sexual predators were not so punitive as to negate legislature’s clearly nonpunitive intent, and therefore did not violate prohibition against double jeopardy; offender was not restricted in his movements into or out of a community, registration was not a historical form of punishment, but merely organized sexual predator's biographical information into data bank for use by law enforcement, registration was intended to regulate conduct of violent sex offenders, registration was not rationally connected to any alternative purpose, and registration was not excessive in relation to its intended purposes of reducing incidences of sexual predatory behavior and protecting the public). See also Rickman v. State, 714 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (Registration requirements of Florida Sexual Predators Act were procedural and regulatory in nature, and, therefore, did not constitute "punishment” in violation of ex post facto clause).

. In Collie, the Court opined:

[U]nder the 1996 Act, the only offenders who are subjected to any form of community and public notification, retrospectively, are those offenders whose current offenses were committed between October 1, 1995, and July 1, 1996. Collie is not included in this category, but as to those offenders who are, section 775.21(4)(b)2, Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), provides that community and public notification will be governed by the former section 775.225, Florida Statutes (1995). The public disclosure permitted under section 775.225 was limited to "certain” sexual predators who were determined to be a "threat to the public” after notice and a hearing. Therefore, we conclude that the procedural safeguards built into section 775.225, Florida Statutes (1995), lessen the overall impact of community and public notification to such an extent that it too cannot be considered a historical form of punishment.

.The Ohio District Court found that the personal appearance provisions of R.C. 2950.06(c) relating to verification unreasonably interfere with the liberty of the individual beyond the necessities of the situation. Williams, supra, at pg. 7.

. The Sexual Predator statute unlike the Sexual Offender statute restricts the employment of a sexual predator by precluding them from employment or volunteer work in a school, day care center, park, playground, or any other place where children congregate. See § 775.21(10)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999).