MARY GORLICK, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2001-08-01
No. 4D00-3643
GUNTHER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
789 So. 2d 1247 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2001) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Mary Gorlick, a nursing home resident, applied for Medicaid benefits through her husband acting as her attorney-in-fact. The hearing officer denied her application because the spouse had a vested interest in signing the assignment of support rights form. The court reversed, finding no legal basis for disqualifying a spouse as a valid representative based on conflict of interest.


Holding

A spouse acting as attorney-in-fact under a valid power of attorney is a valid representative authorized to sign an Assignment of Rights to Support form. The spouse's financial interest in the outcome does not disqualify him from serving as representative, as the action benefits both the institutionalized spouse and the community spouse.


Headnotes

[1] A representative appointed by a power of attorney may sign an assignment of rights to support form on behalf of an institutionalized person applying for Medicaid benefits…

[2] A community spouse's vested interest in the outcome of an institutionalized spouse's Medicaid application does not invalidate their status as a representative for signing…

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Key Quotes

“Under the Social Security Act, section 1924, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. section 1396r-5(c)(3), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65A-1.712, SSI Related Medicaid Resource Eligibility Criteria, an institutionalized person without resources can qualify for Medicaid benefits even if the person's spouse has resources making the couple ineligible for Medicaid.”

Establishes the legal framework allowing institutionalized spouses to qualify for Medicaid independently of spousal resources

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant Gorlick, a nursing home resident, executed a power of attorney naming her husband as her attorney-in-fact. Through this power of attorney, h…

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Opinion of the Court
KLEIN, J.

KLEIN, J.

Appellant, a resident of a nursing home, applied for nursing home Medicaid benefits under Florida’s institutionalized care benefits program. She did so through her husband whom she had appointed to be her attorney-in-fact in a properly executed power of attorney.

Under the Social Security Act, section 1924, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. section 1396r-5(c)(3), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65A-1.712, SSI Related Medicaid Resource Eligibility Criteria, an institutionalized person without resources can qualify for Medicaid benefits even if the person’s spouse has resources making the couple ineligible for Medicaid. In order to do so the institutionalized person must assign to the state any rights of support from the spouse, and the spouse must have refused to use his or her resources for the institutionalized person. The assignment of support form must be signed by the institutionalized person or the person’s representative.

In the present case, appellant’s spouse, pursuant to the power of attorney, signed the assignment of support right form. He also, individually, signed a notice that he was refusing to make his income or resources available to appellant for “any costs including but not limited to medical care and services.”

When appellant applied for Medicaid benefits the hearing officer denied her request, explaining:

The Florida Administrative Code allows for a representative to complete and sign an Assignment of Rights to Support form. And, certainly, the community spouse, as POA [power of attorney], is a representative for the institutionalized spouse. However, in this instance, the community spouse is not a valid representative because he has a vested interest in the outcome of the situation. Therefore, the Department was correct in not allowing the community spouse (the POA) to be the signatory, [bracketed material added.]

The hearing officer’s conclusion that appellant’s spouse was not a “valid representative because he has a vested interest” is unsupported by any statute, rule or precedent, which is probably the reason why the appellee has not filed a brief attempting to sustain the denial of benefits. Although it was certainly in the best interest of appellant’s spouse to take the action which he took, it was also in appellant’s best interest because it would enable appellant’s spouse to better take care of himself. If appellant had been competent to act on her own, or if she had given a power of attorney to someone other than her spouse, the decision to seek Medicaid benefits would have been, in current parlance, a “no brainer.” We therefore reverse.

GUNTHER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


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  • Romaine Nugent v. State, 45 So. 3d 528 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)
    …not remand for reconsideration by the trial court. We conclude that the finding that Nugent violated his probation by committing the battery on the elderly victim is more than sufficient to warrant revocation of his probation. See Cherisma v. State, 789 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Affirmed. GROSS, C.J., and CIKLIN, J., concur.…
  • Dominek D. Grant v. State, 137 So. 3d 436 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)
    …based solely on either contact with his stepchildren or the hearsay account of the physical contact incident, the single violation established of battery on a law enforcement officer is substantial enough to warrant revocation.”); Cherisma v. State, 789 So. 2d 1247, 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (finding trial court erred in finding appellant guilty of one count of amended violation of probation affidavit, but affirming because “the other armed robbery violation is more than substantial enough to warrant revocation…

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