SHERRIE MARBIN, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MERRILL S. COHEN, PETITIONER,
v.
MADELINE COHEN, RESPONDENT
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In a divorce proceeding where the husband died pending dissolution, the wife filed a lis pendens against property owned by a corporation in which the husband held a shareholder interest. The estate's representative challenged the lis pendens, and the court held that because the actual property titleholder (the corporation) was not joined as a party to the action, the lis pendens was entirely without legal basis and must be discharged.
The lis pendens is entirely without legal basis and must be discharged because the actual titleholder of the real estate, M.I.M.E., Inc., was not joined in the complaint below.
[1] A notice of lis pendens is legally baseless and must be discharged when the titleholder of the subject property has not been joined as a party defendant in the underlying…
[2] A lis pendens may not be filed against real property owned by a corporation when the corporation itself has not been named as a party in the lawsuit seeking to affect tit…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where the titleholder of the subject property, who was the appellant in the appeal, but was not in the action below, was not named a party defendant in the complaint, the lis pendens is thereon entirely without legal basis”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that a lis pendens requires the property titleholder to be named as a party defendant
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMerrill and Madeline Cohen were engaged in a bitter divorce when Merrill died. While the dissolution petition was pending, Merrill's daughter was subs…
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PER CURIAM.
The Cohens, Merrill and Madeline, were embroiled in a bitter divorce. While the petition for dissolution was pending, the husband, Merrill S. Cohen, died. Mr. Cohen’s daughter, as the personal representative of his estate, has been substituted.
In her amended petition, along with the dissolution claims, Mrs. Cohen added counts for civil theft, conspiracy, and counts to set aside various fraudulent transfers she alleges Mr. Cohen made during the marriage.
Mr. Cohen, through his personal representative, seeks certiorari review of the trial court’s order denying their motion for discharge of a lis pendens and/or to compel the immediate posting of an adequate cash bond and for sanctions.
While three issues are raised, we believe that one is dispositive.
From the record before this court, Ms. Cohen filed a notice of lis pendens directed to members of Mr. Cohen’s family whom she alleged had acquired his ownership interest in real property owned by a corpo ration named M.I.M.E., Inc. In the action below, Mrs. Cohen contends that the property is a marital asset and seeks to set aside the transfer of real property. On the record Mr. Cohen was one of three shareholders of M.I.M.E., Inc. Although, M.I.M.E., Inc. owns the subject property, it has never been joined as a party in the action below.
Consequently, counsel for Mr. Cohen’s estate argued below, and to this court, that the lis pendens should be discharged, in part, because the property owner, M.I.M.E., Inc., was not joined in the action below. We agree and reverse.
In M.G. Marine Supply Corporation v. Foreign Trade, Inc., 537 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), the Third District, relying upon this court’s decision in Leader Mortgage Co. v. Rickards Electric Service, 348 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), held that where the titleholder of the subject property, who was the appellant in the appeal, but was not in the action below, was not named a party defendant in the complaint, the lis pendens is thereon entirely without legal basis.
In the present case, the titleholder to the real estate, M.I.M.E., Inc., has not been joined in the complaint below. As such, under M.G. Marine Supply Corporation, the subject lis pendens is entirely without legal basis and is therefore discharged.
POLEN, C.J., FARMER and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
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Katarina Loidl v. I & E Grp., Inc., 927 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…e filed against it because it was not a formal party to the action. Where the property owner is not named as a party to the action in the complaint, any lis pendens filed against it is without legal basis and must be dissolved.2 See Marbin v. Cohen, 789 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that lis pendens should be discharged against property owner that was not joined in the action below); HOPO Corp. v. Keller, 798 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quashing trial court’s order denying the motion to dissolve…
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Hopo Corp. v. Keller, 798 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…PER CURIAM. Petitioner, HOPO Corporation, seeks certiorari review of an order denying its motion to dissolve a lis pendens. See Archer v. Archer, 692 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Based on our decision in Marbin v. Cohen, 789 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), we grant the petition as HOPO Corporation has not been joined as a party in the pending dissolution of marriage action. We quash the trial court’s order denying the motion to dissolve HOPO’s lis pendens; the motion should have b…
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Glanz v. Glanz, 63 So. 3d 936 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…was not a party to the proceedings. The court granted the motion, and the notice of lis pendens was filed. Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review that order and filing of the notice. Based upon the controlling authority of Marbin v. Cohen, 789 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), we grant the petition. Without the titleholder of the subject property being made a party to the proceedings, the [*937] lis pendens is “entirely without legal basis.” We quash the order. The lis pen-dens is discharged. WARNER…
Authorities Cited
- The Leader Mortg. Co. v. Rickards Elec. Serv., Inc., 348 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Ira Link v. State, 537 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Hennessy v. State, 537 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)