HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF WINDWARD POINTE CONDOMINIUM, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
THE TERMINIX INTERNATIONAL COMPANY L.P., AND THOMAS SMIDDY, APPELLEES
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The dissenting opinion argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the duty of a landowner to an officer, as required by statute and jury instructions, and by not allowing the jury to consider whether the condition was dangerous.
The dissenting judge would reverse the final judgment against the motel owner and grant a new trial because the trial court failed to provide appropriate jury instructions regarding the landowner's duty and the dangerousness of the condition.
A law enforcement officer was injured when he fell exiting a motel room that opened onto a step. The complaint alleged the owner breached his duty to …
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THREADGILL, Acting Chief Judge.
The Homeowner’s Association of Windward Pointe Condominium, Inc., (the association) appeals a nonfinal order granting a motion to stay proceedings on a civil complaint and compelling arbitration. This case involves termite treatment agreements entered into between the association and the Terminix International Company L.P. for eleven condominium buildings and a clubhouse. The termite control agreements entered into for four of the condominium buildings — building numbers 11, 19, 22, and 23 — do not contain arbitration provisions. In its order compelling arbitration, the trial court recognized that the written agreements affecting those buildings do not contain arbitration clauses. It also referred to “non-arbitrable” claims, but did not identify which claims it determined to be non-arbitrable. Because the written agreements involving buildings 11, 19, 22, and 23 do not express the parties’ intent to arbitrate their disputes, the claims alleged with respect to those buildings are not subject to arbitration. See Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633 (Fla.1999). We therefore reverse the trial court’s order to the extent it could be read to require arbitration of claims relating to buildings 11,19, 22, and 23. We affirm the order in all other respects.
WHATLEY and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur.