J. R. BRUMBY, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF CLEARWATER, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court reviewed an order vacating a default judgment against the City of Clearwater. The Court affirmed the vacation, holding that the underlying contract was beyond the city's authority, and directed the lower court to dismiss the case if the complaint could not be amended to show such authority.
No, the lower court did not err in vacating the decree pro confesso because the bill of complaint did not state a cause of action by failing to show the City's power to make the contract.
“It was quite proper for the court to vacate the decree pro confesso because the bill of complaint on its face does not state a cause of action against the municipality.”
Reasoning for affirming the vacation of the default judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJ. R. Brumby, Jr. filed a bill of complaint seeking specific performance of a contract with the City of Clearwater for channel dredging. A decree pro …
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The appeal in this case is from an order vacating a decree pro confesso theretofore entered against the City of Clearwater, a municipal corporation, on a bill of complaint which sought to require specific performance of the City of Clearwater of the provisions of a certain contract which contemplated the dredging of a channel to be used by the complainant in his private business.
It was quite proper for the court to vacate the decree pro •confesso because the bill of complaint on its face does not state a cause of action against the municipality. The allegations of the bill of complaint entirely fail to show any *634power or authority vested in the municipality to make, execute or perform the contract, specific performance of which was sought.
The order appealed from should be affirmed and, unless the complainant can within a near date to be fixed by the Circuit Court so amend his bill of complaint as to show some power or authority vested in the municipality to make, execute and perform the contract involved, the bill of complaint should be dismissed. It is so ordered.
Reversed, with directions.
Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, Terrell and Brown, J. J., concur.
On Re-hearing
Re-hearing and re-argument were granted on the petition of the appellant herein and the case has been reconsidered pursuant to the presentation on re-hearing.
It now appears to the Court that.not only is the contract on which appellant relies for the relief sought void because the City of Clearwater was without authority to undertake the expenditure of public funds for the purpose of!dredging a channel and basin for the use of an individual with which to carry on and maintain his private busines's but the contract is also void because by its terms the City attempted to finance a private business enterprise for the use and benefit of an individual by undertaking to provide and furnish the major portion of the facilities for conducting such enterprise under the terms and conditions that the cost of such facilities should be reimbursed to the city by the individual for whose benefit the same was proposed to be furnished in monthly installments extending over a period of years. This contravenes the provisions of Section 10 of Article IX of the State Constitution, because the' contract clearly required *635the appropriation of public money for the individual benefit of the appellant and to provide the facilities required for the conducting of his private business enterprise.
The fact that the contract refers to the enterprise as a public utility cannot make it such. All the terms of the contract show that its purpose was to provide facilities for the operation of a private business for individual profit. The contract was void from its inception and neither party acquired any rights under it. Section 10, Article IX, ‘Constitution of Forida.
It is contended that ultra vires must be pleaded before the municipality is entitled to the protection of such defense. It is not necessary for us to here determine this question because in this case the contract sought to be enforced is in controversion of organic law and, therefore, the courts cannot lend their aid to its enforcement, nor to protect any alleged rights flowing to either party solely by reason of the terms and conditions' of the contract.
The decree appealed from should be affirmed and it is now so ordered.
Affirmed.
Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell, and .Brown, J. J., concur.
On Re-hearing
Buford, J.
Re-hearing and re-argument were granted on the petition of the appellant herein and the case has been reconsidered pursuant to the presentation on re-hearing.
It now appears to the Court that.not only is the contract on which appellant relies for the relief sought void because the City of Clearwater was without authority to undertake the expenditure of public funds for the purpose of!dredging a channel and basin for the use of an individual with which to carry on and maintain his private busines's but the contract is also void because by its terms the City attempted to finance a private business enterprise for the use and benefit of an individual by undertaking to provide and furnish the major portion of the facilities for conducting such enterprise under the terms and conditions that the cost of such facilities should be reimbursed to the city by the individual for whose benefit the same was proposed to be furnished in monthly installments extending over a period of years. This contravenes the provisions of Section 10 of Article IX of the State Constitution, because the' contract clearly required the appropriation of public money for the individual benefit of the appellant and to provide the facilities required for the conducting of his private business enterprise.
The fact that the contract refers to the enterprise as a public utility cannot make it such. All the terms of the contract show that its purpose was to provide facilities for the operation of a private business for individual profit. The contract was void from its inception and neither party acquired any rights under it. Section 10, Article IX, ‘Constitution of Forida.
It is contended that ultra vires must be pleaded before the municipality is entitled to the protection of such defense. It is not necessary for us to here determine this question because in this case the contract sought to be enforced is in controversion of organic law and, therefore, the courts cannot lend their aid to its enforcement, nor to protect any alleged rights flowing to either party solely by reason of the terms and conditions' of the contract.
The decree appealed from should be affirmed and it is now so ordered.
Affirmed.
Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell, and .Brown, J. J., concur.
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Local NO. 234 OF United Ass'n OF Journeymen & Apprentices OF Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. OF United States & Canada v. Henley & Beckwith, Inc., 66 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1953)…ard to closed shop contracts. The cases are - legion that a contract against public policy may not be made the basis of any action either in law or in equity. Town of Boca Raton v. Raulerson, 108 Fla. 376, 146 So. 576; Brumby v. City of Clearwater, 108 Fla. 633, 149 So. 203; and authorities cited 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, sec. 209. The principle is applicable to a declaratory judgment suit when the complaint filed by the moving party discloses affirmatively the illegal nature of the contract on which the comp…
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State v. Town of N. Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952)…activities and functions of the state, county, and municipality to that of government, and forbid their engaging directly or indirectly in commercial enterprises for profit." [92 Fla. 1030, 111 So. 120.] In the case of Brumby v. City of Clearwater, 108 Fla. 633, 149 So. 203, 204, the City of Clearwater attempted to spend public funds for the purpose of dredging a channel and basin for the use of an individual to carry on and maintain a private business. The Court held in an opinion by Mr. Justice Buford th…
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Adams v. Hous. Auth. of City of Daytona Beach, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952)…cial question. Spafford v. Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451; Wilton v. St. Johns County, 98 Fla. 26, 123 So. 527, 65 A.L.R. 488; Sibley v. Volusia County, 147 Fla. 256, 2 So. 2d 578; 18 Am.Jur., p. 675, Sec. 46; Brumby v. City of Clearwater, 108 Fla. 633, 149 So. 203. Incidental benefits accruing to the public from the establishment of some private enterprise is not sufficient to make the establishment of such enterprise a public purpose. In the Article on Eminent Domain, 18 Am.Jur., Sec. 45, p. 67…
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