ROBERT HARTLEB, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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In an eminent domain case, the trial court denied the landowner's motion for post-judgment interest on attorney's fees while funds deposited by the Department of Transportation remained in the court registry during his appeal proceedings. The appellate court reversed, holding that post-judgment interest accrues under Florida law from the date of judgment until payment, and that the landowner's decision to await appeal outcomes rather than withdraw funds does not forfeit his right to interest.
The court held that the landowner is entitled to post-judgment interest accruing from the date of judgment until the day he withdrew the funds from the court registry. Post-judgment interest under Florida Statute § 55.03 is owed by the judgment debtor and continues to accrue during appellate proceedings, even when funds are deposited in the court registry.
[1] A judgment debtor owes post-judgment interest from the date of judgment until payment.
[2] A condemnor is not immune from statutory liability for post-judgment interest.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the judgment debtor owes post-judgment interest "from the date of judgment until payment." § 55.03, Fla.Stat. (2000)”
Establishes the core statutory rule that post-judgment interest accrues from judgment date until payment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Department of Transportation deposited money awarded as attorney's fees to the landowner in an eminent domain proceeding into the court registry. …
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FARMER, J.
After the trial court awarded attorneys’ fees to the landowner in an eminent domain proceeding, DOT deposited the money into the court registry. Without taking the money, the landowner sought rehearing and unsuccessfully took appeals all the way to the supreme court. When the appeals were finally ended — nearly three years later — he withdrew the funds from the court registry. The trial court denied his motion to compel DOT to pay interest for the period of the appeal proceedings while the money lay in the court registry. We reverse.
We start with the rule that the judgment debtor owes post-judgment interest “from the date of judgment until payment.” § 55.03, Fla.Stat. (2000). DOT is not immune from this statutory liability for post judgment interest, Palm Beach County v. Town of Palm Beach, 579 So. 2d 719, 720-721 (Fla.1991), but the landowner who withdraws funds deposited into the Court Registry by the condemnor gives up his appeal. See § 73.131, Fla.Stat. (2000) (“If, at any time after entry of the judgment, a defendant shall take out of the court the amount due him or her, any pending appeal taken by the defendant shall be dismissed by the appellate court....”).
In this case the landowner did not withdraw the funds, however, but awaited the outcome of his appeals before asking for the money. Refusing to let him have his interest in this circumstance is unfair because:
“Denying interest ... would ... place on appellants in eminent domain proceedings an unjustified double burden having to choose between taking an appeal or taking the award, as well as having to prevail on appeal in order to receive present value of the award. Under such a scheme, only winners would receive the full compensation mandated by the state constitution.”
Behm v. Division of Admin., Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 383 So. 2d 216, 219 (Fla.1980). See also Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla.1968) (holding that post judgment interest on an award of attorneys’ fees is not tolled during appellate review); Stager v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 189 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) (holding that the prosecution of an appeal by the successful party does not stop the running of interest).
Thus, the landowner is entitled to post-judgment interest accruing until the day he withdrew the funds from the court registry.
REVERSED.
KLEIN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1968)
- Behm v. Division OF Administration, 383 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1980)
- Palm Beach Cnty. v. Town OF Palm Beach, 579 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1991)
- Stager v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 189 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)