COLUMBUS RICKEY ASHLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Columbus Rickey Ashley appealed his conviction and habitual violent felony (HVFO) sentence for firearm possession by a convicted felon. The trial court initially imposed an HFO sentence by mistake but corrected it three days later to an HVFO sentence. Ashley claimed Double Jeopardy violation, but the appellate court affirmed, holding that no jeopardy attached because the initial sentence was not a legal sentence but a clerical error.
The trial court did not violate Double Jeopardy because the initial HFO sentence was not a legal sentence but a clerical mistake, and jeopardy did not attach. The Double Jeopardy prohibition against imposing a harsher sentence applies only when a trial court changes its mind or initially imposes a legal sentence, not when correcting a simple error.
[1] A trial court may correct a sentence imposed as a result of a clerical mistake or a simple misunderstanding of the facts presented, even after the initial sentence has co…
[2] Double Jeopardy protections do not attach when a trial court imposes a sentence based on a mistake regarding the noticed and proven sentencing factors, rather than a disc…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well-established that a trial court cannot set aside a legal sentence and then impose a harsher sentence after the initial sentence commenced.”
Establishes the general Double Jeopardy rule applicable to sentencing corrections
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAshley was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At the first sentencing hearing, the State proved and both Ashley and the trial …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Expectation Of Finality In Sentencing cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Columbus Rickey Ashley, appeals his conviction and habitual violent felony (HVFO) sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We affirm.
Appellant’s challenge to his conviction does not warrant discussion. However, we briefly address the issue regarding his HVFO sentence. It is undisputed that the State was seeking an HVFO sentence and that all of the sentencing proceedings dealt with the issue of Appellant’s qualification as an HVFO. At the first sentencing hearing, the State proved and both Appellant and the trial court accepted that Appellant qualified as an HVFO. The possibility of an HFO sentence was never discussed, nor did the State file a notice of intent to seek HFO sentencing or prove that Appellant would qualify as an HFO. After Appellant’s qualification as an HVFO was established, the discussions centered around what length of HVFO sentence Appellant should receive. Appellant asked for the 10-year minimum, while the State sought the 30-year maximum with the 10-year minimum mandatory. On the following day, the trial court mistakenly imposed a 25-year HFO sentence instead of an HVFO sentence. Three days later, the trial court corrected its mistake and imposed a 25-year HVFO sentence with a 10-year minimum mandatory term.
Appellant argues that the trial court violated Double Jeopardy when it imposed the HVFO sentence three days after mistakenly imposing an habitual felony offender (HFO) sentence. It is well-established that a trial court cannot set aside a legal sentence and then impose a harsher sentence after the initial sentence commenced. See Hopping v. State, 708 So. 2d 263 (Fla.1998); Troupe v. Rowe, 283 So. 2d 857 (Fla.1973). However, “[t]he Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner.” United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 135, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). In this case, Troupe and Hopping do not apply because the trial court neither changed its mind nor initially imposed a legal sentence. The trial court’s initial imposition of an HFO sentence was the result of a simple mistake about what had been noticed and then proven the day before. It was not a discretionary judgment based on the facts to impose a lighter sentence. See Harris v. State, 645 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla.1994). Thus, Appellant had no expectation of finality after the trial court imposed the first sentence, and jeopardy did not attach.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM Appellant’s conviction and sentence.
BARFIELD, C.J., MINER and PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Columbus Rickey Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 2003)…*1271] HARDING, Senior Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. As the court below noted, “the Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner.” Ashley v. State, 772 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 135, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980)). As the majority concedes, the trial judge simply misspoke. During sentencing, instead of saying “habitual violent felony offende…1 / 3
-
State v. Akins, 69 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2011)…ate, 827 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); and White v. State, 892 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). In Ashley II, we granted discretionary review based on express and direct conflict between the First District’s decision in Ashley v. State (Ashley I), 772 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), and the Fourth District’s decision in Evans, 675 So. 2d 1012. There, we observed that the issue in both Ashley I and Evans was whether double jeopardy is violated when a trial court vacates an imposed sentence and resen-tences t…
-
Shepard v. State, 940 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…the trial court’s imposition of an HFO sentence: [W]as the result of a simple mistake about what had been noticed and then proven the day before. It was not a discretionary judgment based on the facts to impose a lighter sentence. Ashley v. State, 772 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The supreme court reversed, finding the resentencing of Ashley violated Ashley’s constitutional right against double jeopardy. The court went on to state: Once a sentence has been imposed and the person begins to serve the…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. DiFRANCESCO, 449 U.S. 117 (U.S. 1980)
- Flazell Troupe v. The Honorable Ellen Morphonios Rowe & the Honorable Paul Baker, 283 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1973)
- Darin S. Hopping v. State, 708 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1998)
- Harris v. State, 645 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1994)