MARY C. GHATA, APPELLANT,
v.
GHASSAN J. GHATA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellate court reversed the trial court's award of only rehabilitative alimony and remanded for the trial court to award permanent alimony based on the significant income discrepancy between the parties.
A trial court abuses its discretion by awarding only rehabilitative alimony when a substantial income discrepancy exists between the parties in a marital dissolution action.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion in awarding only rehabilitative alimony when a substantial discrepancy exists between the parties' current and potential incomes and o…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a marital dissolution action, the trial court awarded the wife only rehabilitative alimony despite a tremendous discrepancy between the parties' cu…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Income Disparity cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM
In light of the tremendous discrepancy between the parties’ current and potential incomes, and upon consideration of other relevant factors as specified section 61.08, Florida Statutes, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award permanent alimony to the appellant wife in this marital dissolution action. Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment of dissolution to the extent that it awards the wife only rehabilitative alimony, and we remand this case to the trial court for the trial court to award the former wife permanent alimony in a sum to be determined by the trial court following such further proceedings as may be deemed necessary. We recognize that, in light of our decision, it may be necessary for the trial court to reconsider or restructure its rehabilitative alimony award, see, e.g., Burrill v. Burrill, 701 So. 2d 354, 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and the former husband’s security obligation. See § 61.08(3), Fla. Stat. On remand, we also direct the trial court to amend the child support provision of its order to reflect the parties’ agreement that support obligations for each child continue beyond 18 years of age in accordance with the provisions of section 743.07(2), Florida Statutes. The final judgment of dissolution is otherwise affirmed.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
ALLEN, BENTON and PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR.