THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
KINTA SWAN MITCHEL, APPELLEE
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The State appeals the trial court's discharge of defendant Kinta Swan Mitchel based on alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial. The appellate court reversed, holding that Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(e) applies to persons in federal custody, tolling the speedy trial period until they are returned to state jurisdiction.
A person in federal custody is not deemed available for trial in state court and is therefore not entitled to the benefit of the speedy trial rule until returned to the jurisdiction of the state court. Rule 3.191(e) applies regardless of whether the defendant was previously in state custody before being placed in federal custody.
[1] A person in federal custody is not considered available for trial in state court for speedy trial purposes until returned to the state's jurisdiction.
[2] The speedy trial period for a defendant in federal custody does not commence until the defendant is returned to the jurisdiction of the state court and written notice of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A person who is in federal custody or incarcerated in a jail or correctional institution outside the jurisdiction of this state or a subdivision thereof, and who is charged with a crime by indictment or information issued or filed under the laws of this state, is not entitled to the benefit of this rule until that person returns or is returned to the jurisdiction of the court within which the Florida charge is pending”
Rule 3.191(e) language establishing that federal custody tolls speedy trial rights
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn March 23, 1999, Mitchel was charged with carrying a concealed firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was arraigned o…
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FLETCHER, Judge.
The State appeals from an order discharging the defendant based on the al leged violation of his right to a speedy trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. Finding the provisions of subsection 3.191(e) to be applicable, we reverse.
On March 23, 1999, defendant, Kinta Swan Mitchel, was charged by information with one count of carrying a concealed firearm and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was arraigned on these charges on April 23, 1999. Prior to trial, however, the defendant was taken into federal custody and a continuance was taken. On September 27, 1999, the defendant moved for discharge based upon the running of the speedy trial period. The trial court subsequently entered the order appealed from discharging the defendant after concluding that defendant was continually available for trial notwithstanding his federal detention.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(e) states:
“(e) Prisoners outside Jurisdiction. A person who is in federal custody or incarcerated in a jail or correctional institution outside the jurisdiction of this state or a subdivision thereof, and who is charged with a crime by indictment or information issued or filed under the laws of this state, is not entitled to the benefit of this rule until that person returns or is returned to the jurisdiction of the court within which the Florida charge is pending and until written notice of this fact is filed with the court and served on the prosecutor. For such persons, the time period under (a) commences on the date the last act required under this subdivision.... ”
A person in federal custody is not deemed available for trial in the state court and, as the rule clearly states, is therefore not entitled to the benefit of speedy trial until he is returned to the jurisdiction of the state. See State v. Delgado, 557 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); State v. Covello, 491 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Defendant argues that the provisions of rule 3.191(e) do not apply because he was in state custody prior to being placed in federal custody. However, the rule does not draw such a distinction. We also find State v. Agee, 588 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), approved, 622 So. 2d 473 (Fla.1993) distinguishable because that case involved a nolle pros situation.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment discharging the defendant, and remand the cause for further proceedings.
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Lowen Espinueva v. State, 946 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…the defendant is in federal custody. See, Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(e) (providing that defendant is not entitled to benefit of speedy trial rule until federal [*625] custody ends and defendant is returned to Florida custody); see also, State v. Mitchel, 768 So. 2d 1223, 1224 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), rev. denied, 804 So. 2d 329 (Fla.2001) (provisions of rule 3.191(e) apply even when defendant was in state custody before being taken into federal custody). We therefore affirm his conviction. Defendant’s plea was conditi…
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Williams v. State, 946 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…e period under subdivision (a) commences on the date the last act required under this subdivision occurs.... Thus, rule 3.191(e) prevents the rule-based speedy trial period from running while the accused is in federal custody. See State v. Mitchel, 768 So. 2d 1223, 1224 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). Here, even assuming that Williams was first arrested by the CSPD, and that the arrest constituted a state arrest, the FBI took custody of Williams that very day. Thus, the Florida speedy trial period did not commence until…
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Curt v. State, 1 So. 3d 365 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See State v. Mitchel, 768 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Agee, 622 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1993)
- State v. Agee, 588 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- State v. Covello, 491 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- State v. Froilan Delgado, 557 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)