DAYNA MARIA MARCHETTA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2000-08-18
No. 2D99-79
PARKER, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., Concur.
766 So. 2d 1126 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Dayna Marchetta appealed her sentencing, arguing it was harsher than her codefendants' despite her lesser participation in armed robberies. The trial court erroneously believed it lacked discretion to impose a downward departure based on comparative culpability of codefendants, though it acknowledged such disparity was unjust. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding that downward departures can be justified to align sentences based on relative culpability.


Holding

A downward departure may be imposed to align a defendant's sentence with a codefendant's lesser sentence if the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's culpability is no greater than the codefendant's. The trial court erred in believing it lacked discretion to impose such a departure.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court may impose a downward departure sentence to make a defendant's sentence more equivalent to a codefendant's lesser sentence.

[2] A downward departure sentence is justified to meet a codefendant's sentence if the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's culpability is no gre…

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Key Quotes

“Although an upward departure cannot be justified solely in order to match the sentence of a codefendant, a downward departure may be imposed for that reason.”

Establishes the key legal principle distinguishing treatment of upward versus downward departures

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Facts & Procedural History

Marchetta furnished a gun and vehicle used in two counts of armed robbery. Her codefendants, who actually committed the robberies, received lighter se…

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Opinion of the Court
NORTHCUTT, Judge.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Dayna Marchetta complains that her guidelines sentence was harsher than those imposed on her codefendants, whose participation in two counts of armed robbery far exceeded hers. Indeed, when sentencing Marchetta the trial court expressed its distaste for the fact that Mar-chetta, who furnished a gun and vehicle used in the robberies, would be incarcerated longer than the men who actually committed them. However, believing that “that is not a valid reason for a departure downward as to Ms. Marchetta,” the court sentenced her to the bottom of the guideline range. The court was mistaken in its belief that it did not have discretion to impose a downward departure sentence under these circumstances.

Although an upward departure cannot be justified solely in order to match the sentence of a codefendant, a downward departure may be imposed for that reason. See Sanders v. State, 510 So. 2d 296, 298 (Fla.1987). In Sanders the supreme court cautioned that each case must be decided entirely on its own facts and circumstances. There is no requirement for a departure below the guidelines. “Moreover, the relative culpability of codefend-ants in each case will be different. Therefore, the judge would only be justified in departing downward to meet a codefend-ant’s sentence if the record established beyond a reasonable doubt that the culpability of the defendant was no greater than that of the codefendant.” Sanders, 510 So. 2d at 298. See also Marsh v. State, 546 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (affirming downward departure sentence where trial court attempted to make sentence more equivalent to codefendant’s lesser sentence); State v. Davis, 657 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (holding that desire to make defendant’s sentence consistent with codefendant’s was valid reason for downward departure), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Powell, 703 So. 2d 444 (Fla.1997).

We reverse and remand for resentencing to permit the trial court to reconsider the sentence and to reevaluate whether, in its discretion, a downward departure sen tence is justified. See also Kelly v. State, 727 So. 2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (“Since the trial court erroneously indicated that it did not have discretion in imposing the fifteen-year minimum mandatory term [habitual violent felony offender], the appellant is entitled to be resentenced.”).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

PARKER, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Maritza Fernandez, 927 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
    …arture sentence. We agree. See Sanders v. State, 510 So. 2d 296, 298 (Fla.1987) (approving the consideration of a eo-defen-dant’s below guidelines sentence where co-defendant “was at least, if not more, culpable than defendant”); Marchetta v. State, 766 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (reversing guidelines sentence where trial court suffered from misimpression that it could not consider lower sentence of more culpable defendant).2 If a legal reason is received by a court, we are compelled by section 921.002(3)…
  • State v. Casner, 825 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
    …permit the court to reconsider its decision. In so doing, we express no preference for any of the discretionary remedies the court may choose to apply in this case. See Simpkins v. State, 784 So. 2d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Marchetta v. State, 766 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Driscoll v. Sharp, 711 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). WHATLEY and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur.…
  • Profetto v. State, 198 So. 3d 684 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)
    …ard from the thirty-five-year sentence based on a codefendant’s lesser sentence if the two were equally culpable and there was not a great disparity in their criminal records. See Sanders v. State, 510 So. 2d 296, 298 (Fla.1987); Marchetta v. State, 766 So. 2d 1126, 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Profetto’s claim is facially insufficient insofar as it does not offer any specifics regarding the codefendant’s charge, sentence, or prior criminal history. That said, Profetto is entitled to an opportunity to amend this…

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