SHAROD DOZIER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Sharod Dozier appeals his cocaine possession conviction, challenging the validity of the traffic stop that led to the discovery of drugs. The Florida appellate court reversed, holding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Dozier's vehicle based solely on information from an unvetted source.
The court reversed, holding that the stop was unconstitutional because the officer lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigatory stop. The State failed to establish the informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge, and the officer's only observation—that Dozier was driving a car—was insufficient to justify the stop.
[1] A police officer must have a well-founded, articulable suspicion that a defendant is engaged in criminal activity to justify an investigatory stop.
[2] An officer's observation that a person is merely driving a car is insufficient, on its own, to create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably justify the stop.”
Establishes the legal standard for Terry stops requiring specific, articulable facts and rational inferences.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTampa police officer Mark Montague received information from a source he described as someone who 'helped me before in cases but not really an informa…
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BLUE, Acting Chief Judge.
Sharod Dozier appeals his judgment and sentence for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. We reverse because the State failed to present evidence to support the validity of the stop of Dozier’s automobile.
Tampa police officer Mark Montague was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing. He testified that he was told by a subject that there were drugs in Dozier’s car. Officer Montague described the source of his information as someone who “helped me before in cases but not really an informant just someone giving me information in the past.” Officer Montague had no other details regarding Dozier. Based on this information, Officer Montague followed Dozier’s car and stopped it. The officer observed no law or traffic violations prior to the stop, or even any suspicious behavior. After the stop, Dozier consented to a search, and Officer Montague found six rocks of cocaine under the dashboard.
The question presented is whether Officer Montague’s information provided reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry
stop of the car. In order to justify a stop under Terry, “a police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably justify the stop.” State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820, 822 (Fla.1981). The officer must have a well-founded, articulable suspicion that the defendant is engaged in criminal activity. See Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993). Here, the only thing observed by Officer Montague was that Dozier was driving a car. This observation alone was insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Dozier was engaged in criminal activity.
The justification for an investigatory stop need not come solely from an officer’s own observations-the officer may also rely upon information provided by others. See Pinkney v. State, 666 So. 2d 590, 592 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). “If the information is not personally observed, but received from an informant, the informant’s ‘veracity,’ ‘reliability,’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ are critical in establishing the reasonable suspicion required for a stop.” Pinkney, 666 So. 2d at 592 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)). Here, the State presented no evidence to show these details as applied to the source of Officer Montague’s information. In addition to the lack of information regarding the informant’s veracity and reliability, it is significant that the record fails to show how the informant knew what she claimed to know.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the facts presented by the State at the suppression hearing did not justify the Terry stop. Because the officer did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigatory stop, the initial detention was illegal and the resulting acquisition of the cocaine was the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of Dozier’s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
FULMER and SALCINES, JJ., Concur. . Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
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Arseles Miller v. State, 780 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…o. 2d at 727. The information given by the C.I. was not sufficiently reliable so as to provide the officers with the reasonable suspicion needed for a Terry1 stop nor the probable cause required to search Miller or his vehicle. See Dozier v. State, 766 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The motion to suppress should have been granted. Reversed. NORTHCUTT, A.C.J., and GREEN, J., and CARLIN, SCOTT, Associate Judge, concur. . Teny v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).…
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Tracey v. State, 69 So. 3d 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…in the alleged criminal conduct; or how the cell phone was involved in the transactions.” The statement in no way demonstrated how the confidential source was reliable. See generally State v. Maynard, 783 So. 2d 226, 230 (Fla.2001); Dozier v. State, 766 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). To say that the state violated section 943.23 in obtaining real time CSLI does not mean that an exclusionary rule applies to prevent the state from using any “evidence derived” from the violation. § 934.06, Fla. Stat. (2009). Un…
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Torris Walls v. State, 814 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…two Orlando police officers (members of the Metropolitan Bureau of Investigation), at the Orlando International Airport and the resulting search of his person was the fruit of the illegal detention, to which he did not consent. See Dozier v. State, 766 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Sims v. State, 743 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). In reviewing these issues, we must take the trial court’s ruling as presumptively correct and accept its fact findings, if supported by substantial competent evidence. Terry v. St…
Authorities Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968)
- Tedd J. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993)
- Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (U.S. 1990)
- State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1981)
- Tocci v. State, 666 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)