RUSSELL MILLER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal enforced its prior mandate ordering a new trial after the trial court improperly refused to grant the new trial on remand. The court held that trial courts lack discretion to modify or refuse to implement an appellate court's mandate, regardless of changed circumstances.
A trial court lacks discretionary power to alter, modify, or refuse to obey an appellate court's mandate. The appellate court's order for a new trial was unconditional and unequivocal, not conditional like the decision in McCray, and therefore the trial court was required to conduct the new trial as ordered.
[1] A trial court's role upon receiving a mandate from an appellate court is ministerial, and it lacks discretionary power to alter or modify the appellate court's order.
[2] An unconditional reversal and remand for a new trial by an appellate court requires the trial court to grant a new trial, even if subsequent efforts to locate a confident…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial court's role upon the issuance of a mandate from an appellate court becomes purely ministerial, and it's function is limited to obeying the appellate court's order or decree.... A trial court does not have discretionary power to alter, or modify the mandate of an appellate court in any way, shape or form.”
Establishes the core principle that trial courts must strictly obey appellate mandates without discretion to modify them.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMiller's conviction was originally reversed and remanded for a new trial due to the trial court's error in denying disclosure of a confidential inform…
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PER CURIAM.
In Miller v. State, 729 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), we reversed appellant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, because the trial court erred in not granting appellant’s motion for a disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant. On remand, the identity was disclosed, but efforts to locate the confidential informant who, according to an affidavit, was a “street person in Lake Worth,” were unsuccessful.
When the failure to find the informant was made known to the trial court, the court entered an order denying appellant the new trial which we had ordered and reinstating his conviction. The court reasoned that, if the informant were not testifying, there was nothing to be gained by a new trial, citing McCray v. State, 730 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
In McCray, the second district, in a case involving the same issue, conditionally reversed for a new trial, stating:
Therefore, we reverse and remand for an in camera inspection. The trial court shall determine if the confidential informant’s testimony tends to exculpate Mr. McCray on the misidentification issue or varies materially from the testimony of the police officer who identified Mr. McCray at trial. If it does, a new trial will be required with the disclosure of the informant’s identity ordered; if not, the determination should contain specific findings to support that conclusion and the conviction should be reinstated.
Id. at 818.
In the present case the reversal was not, as it was in McCray, conditional. We clearly and unequivocally ordered a new trial. In Torres v. Jones, 652 So. 2d 893, 894 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), the court explained:
A trial court’s role upon the issuance of a mandate from an appellate court becomes purely ministerial, and it’s function is limited to obeying the appellate court’s order or decree.... A trial court does not have discretionary power to alter, or modify the mandate of an appellate court in any way, shape or form.
In addition, as we noted at the end of our original opinion, appellant raised another issue which we did not address because of our reversal on the issue involving the informant. That issue, which involved the admission of evidence, has never been resolved.
We grant the motion to enforce mandate, reverse the order reinstating the conviction, and remand for a new trial.
GUNTHER, SHAHOOD, and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
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- Koslovsky Realty, Inc. v. Losek, 729 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- BAY RAG & Grading, Inc. v. C & H Clothing, Inc., 652 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- McCRAY v. State, 730 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)