TRACES FASHION GROUP, INC., D/B/A ERIKA, LTD., DENISE MARIE AND ARTURO A. DOPAZO, INDIVIDUALLY AND HILDA I. DOPAZO, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLANTS,
v.
C & C MANAGEMENT, INC., D/B/A AMERICAN FACTOR, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2000-07-19
No. 3D99-1836
Before JORGENSON, LEVY, and FLETCHER, JJ.
763 So. 2d 502 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Traces Fashion Group and individual defendants appealed a summary judgment awarding possession of property to C & C Management in a replevin action. The court reversed, holding that summary judgment was improper because material factual issues remained regarding the ordinary replevin claim and procedural defects existed.


Holding

The court held that summary judgment was improper because (1) the prejudgment writ of replevin is only a summary procedure to obtain interim possession pending trial and does not finally adjudicate the claims; (2) material issues of fact precluded summary judgment; and (3) procedural defects existed in the service of the motion.


Headnotes

[1] A prejudgment writ of replevin is a summary procedure for the limited purpose of obtaining possession of property ex parte to secure it against danger of destruction, con…

[2] The issuance of a prejudgment writ of replevin does not finally adjudicate the claims between the parties when other causes of action, affirmative defenses, or countercla…

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Key Quotes

“The prejudgment writ of re-plevin ... is a summary procedure for the limited purpose of obtaining possession of property on an ex parte application to the court to secure it against the danger of destruction, concealment, waste, removal from the state, removal from the jurisdiction of the court, or transfer to an innocent purchaser during the pendency of the action.”

Establishes that the prejudgment writ is interim in nature and does not finally adjudicate the claims

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Facts & Procedural History

C & C Management sued Traces Fashion Group and individual defendants for replevin, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. An ex parte writ of repl…

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Opinion of the Court
FLETCHER, Judge.

FLETCHER, Judge.

Traces Fashion Group, Inc., d/b/a Erika, Ltd. and Denise Marie, and Arturo A. Dopazo and Hilda I. Dopazo, individually [defendants] appeal a final summary judgment as to possession entered against them and in favor of C & C Management, Inc., d/b/a American Factor [plaintiff]. We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sued defendants for replevin, breach of contract and unjust enrichment/quantum meruit after them business relationship soured. In the replevin count, plaintiff described certain property in defendants’ possession in which it claimed to have a perfected security interest. Plain tiff further alleged that the claimed property was in danger of concealment, waste or removal from the state, and requested the issuance of a writ of replevin without notice to defendants. The ex parte writ was issued and the property was transferred to plaintiff. After unsuccessfully moving to dissolve the writ, defendants filed an answer, affirmative defenses and counterclaim, including a demand for jury trial.

The procedure utilized for issuance of the prejudgment writ of replevin properly followed the provisions of Section 78.068, Florida Statutes (1997) and served to determine plaintiffs right to possession of the subject property pending trial. See 12 Fla. Jur.2d Conversion and Replevin § 35 (1998) (“The prejudgment writ of re-plevin ... is a summary procedure for the limited purpose of obtaining possession of property on an ex parte application to the court to secure it against the danger of destruction, concealment, waste, removal from the state, removal from the jurisdiction of the court, or transfer to an innocent purchaser during the pendency of the action.”).

It did not, however, finally adjudicate the claims between the parties as there remained pending for trial the ordinary replevin, breach of contract and unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claims, as well as the defendants’ affirmative defenses and counterclaim. See McMurrain v. Fason, 584 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“If the complaint contains counts for ordinary replevin and other causes of action ... those claims obviously remain pending for trial.”).

In the instant case, however, upon plaintiffs motion and without a trial, the trial court entered the order appealed from, summarily finding in favor of plaintiff and awarding damages. This was clearly error. Contrary to plaintiffs reasoning, Section-78.18, Florida Statutes (1997) does not support entry of judgment without a trial.

Section 78.18 states that plaintiff is entitled to judgment for damages caused by defendants’ unlawful detention of the property, but does not indicate when such judgment is to be entered. In fact, Chapter 78 makes no provision for the procedure to be used in adjudicating the ordinary replevin action. We must assume, therefore, that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.010 cmt. (1967) (“To the extent that statutes dealing specifically with a particular civil action or proceeding do not set out a specific rule for a particular phase of practice or procedure, such phase would appear to be governed by these rules.”).

Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c), plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should have been served at least 20 days before the hearing (instead of the 10 days allowed herein). More importantly, the record shows the existence of genuine issues of material fact which preclude entry of summary judgment.

For these reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Marzuk Al-Hakim v. Bennie R. Holder, 787 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
    …applied when considering an order granting a motion to dismiss. Randles v. Moore, 780 So. 2d 158, 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). We note that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure apply to a replevin action. Traces Fashion Group, Inc. v. C & C Mgmt., Inc., 763 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). It is evident that the circuit court was attempting to get this matter resolved expeditiously and on the merits; however, the procedures which were applied were faulty. A motion to dismiss is not a substitute for a motion f…
  • Brown v. Reynolds, 872 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …ions of Brown’s complaint, he pursued an appropriate remedy in the circuit court. An action for replevin is a civil action, and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure apply. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.010; Traces Fashion Group, Inc., v. C & C Mgmt., Inc., 763 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Weigh Less for Life, Inc., v. Barnett Bank of Orange Park, 399 So. 2d 88, 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). At the conclusion of an action for replevin where the defendant has retained possession of the property during the pendency of…

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