STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
REGINALD B. COLEMAN, RESPONDENT
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The Act imposing a mandatory 15-year sentence for prison releasees who reoffend does not violate separation of powers, and trial courts lack discretion to impose a different sentence when the statutory criteria are satisfied.
[1] The prison releasee reoffender statute requiring a mandatory minimum sentence does not violate the separation of powers principle.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceColeman, a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(2), was sentenced to a mandatory 15-year term after the State sought sentencing pursuant t…
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PER CURIAM.
We have for review the decision in Coleman v. State, 739 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), in which the Second District reversed Coleman’s mandatory 15-year sentence which had been imposed based upon the trial court’s understanding that, because Coleman qualified as a prison releas-ee reoffender under section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes (1997)(the “Act”), and the State had sought sentencing pursuant to the Act, the trial court did not have discretion in imposing the sentence. In so doing, the Second District relied on its opinion in State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), and certified conflict with Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), and McKnight v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. See V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We recently quashed the Second District’s decision in Cotton and approved the First District’s decision in Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), holding that the Act, as properly interpreted by the First District, does not violate separation of powers, and rejecting other constitutional challenges to the Act. See State v. Cotton, SC94996 & SC95281, — So. 2d -, 2000 WL 766521 (Fla. June 15, 2000). Accordingly, for the reasons expressed in Cotton, we quash the Second District’s decision in this case, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
QUINCE, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, Nos. SC94996 & SC95281, - So. 2d -, 2000 WL 766521 (Fla. June 15, 2000).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Straughter v. State, 770 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…er Act (“Act”) is unconstitutional is erroneous and is reversed. See State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000). The cause is remanded for a determination as to whether appellant qualifies for sentencing under the Act. See State v. Cole [*1252] man, 761 So. 2d 323 (Fla.2000); State v. Young, 766 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JOANOS, LAWRENCE AND VAN NORTWICK, JJ., CONCUR.…
Authorities Cited
- Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- McKNIGHT v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Jewell F. Raimondo v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Coleman v. State, 739 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)