THERON THOMAS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2000-04-19
No. 4D99-4161
Warner, C.J., Farmer, J., Taylor, J.
756 So. 2d 217 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

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Synopsis

The court reversed and remanded a trial court's order denying post-conviction relief because the judge who entered the order had recused herself days earlier, rendering the order void.


Holding

Orders entered by a recused judge are void and have no effect.


Headnotes

[1] A trial judge's orders entered after recusal are void and have no legal effect, requiring remand to a newly assigned judge for consideration on the merits.

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Key Quotes

“[O]nce a trial judge has recused himself, further orders of the recused judge are void and have no effect.”

Court citing Bolt v. Smith, 594 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), establishing the controlling legal principle.

Facts & Procedural History

Appellant Thomas sought post-conviction relief. The trial judge recused herself just days before entering an order summarily denying his motion for po…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Theron Thomas appeals a trial court order summarily denying his motion for post-conviction relief and rehearing therefrom. The record reveals that the trial judge had recused herself just days before entering the order denying post-conviction relief. This renders the order void. “nce a trial judge has re-cused himself, further orders of the re-cused judge are void and have no effect.” Bolt v. Smith, 594 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Accord Lea v. Wigton, 705 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Long Term Management, Inc. v. University Nursing Care Ctr., Inc., 704 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Rogers v. State, 341 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 953 (Fla.1977). See also Meaweather v. State, 732 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

The State has conceded that the order is void and that the cause should be remanded for consideration by a newly assigned judge. There is no reason for this court to address the merits of the motion for post-conviction relief, and we therefore decline to do so.'

The order denying post-conviction relief, and the order denying rehearing therefrom, are therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further consideration on its merits by the newly assigned judge.

REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.

WARNER, C.J., FARMER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Davis v. State, 849 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
    …motion for rehearing. We agree and reverse. Once a trial judge recuses himself from a given case, any subsequent orders he enters in that case are void and have no effect. See Haverty v. State, 830 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Thomas v. State, 756 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Meaweather v. State, 732 So. 2d 499, 500 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Weiss v. Miami Nat’l Bank, 320 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). In the instant case, Judge Buttner recused himself on February 5, 2002. He lacked authority to make any…
  • Goolsby v. State, 914 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
    …she enters in that case, are void and have no effect. Jenkins v. Motorola, Inc., 911 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); see Davis v. State, 849 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Haverty v. State, 830 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Thomas v. State, 756 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In denying Goolsby a new hearing on his rule 3.850 motion, Judge Waller concluded that she had not recused herself from Goolsby’s case. We disagree, and conclude that a fair reading of Judge Waller’s order, stating that it woul…
  • Brinson v. State, 873 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …at the order on appeal is void because the trial judge who entered the order had previously entered an order recusing himself in the same trial court case. We agree that the prior order of recusal renders the present order void. See Thomas v. State, 756 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Accordingly, we reverse the order summarily denying appellant’s rule 3.850 motion and remand to the trial court for a newly assigned trial judge to consider the motion on its merits. Id. Reversed and remanded, with directio…

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