WALTER JOHNSON, PETITIONER,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA; SANDRA TAYLOR, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, MARTIN TREATMENT CENTER; AND MIKE RIVERA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MARTIN TREATMENT CENTER, RESPONDENTS

Fla. 4th DCA | 1999-10-06
No. 99-2473
GUNTHER and GROSS, JJ., concur.
747 So. 2d 402 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1999) Negative Treatment
Cited by 20 cases

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Synopsis

Walter Johnson petitioned for habeas corpus after being detained under Florida's Jimmy Ryce Act following completion of his criminal sentence. The court held that the multidisciplinary team report evaluating him as a sexually violent predator must be signed by all team members, not just one, to justify civil confinement after sentence completion.


Holding

The court held that both members of the multidisciplinary team must join in the assessment for it to support civil confinement under the Jimmy Ryce Act. The court ordered Johnson's release unless, within 72 hours, a report signed by all team members finding he meets the statutory requirements for designation as a sexually violent predator was filed.


Headnotes

[1] Civil confinement of a person after serving a criminal sentence requires scrupulous compliance with statutory provisions and constitutional rights.

[2] A written assessment and recommendation from a multidisciplinary team is a predicate for commencing civil confinement under the Jimmy Ryce Act.

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Key Quotes

“the continued confinement of a person after he has served his full sentence for conviction of a crime is serious enough to warrant scrupulous compliance with the statute permitting such confinement, not to mention the applicable constitutional provisions”

Establishes the heightened scrutiny applied to civil confinement after sentence completion

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Facts & Procedural History

Johnson completed his criminal sentence, and the State of Florida sought to continue his confinement under the Jimmy Ryce Act based on a report by a m…

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Opinion of the Court
FARMER, J.

FARMER, J.

Petitioner has completed his sentence, and the State of Florida has moved to continue his confinement under the lately enacted “Jimmy Ryce Act.” See Ch. 98-64, Laws of Fla. A report was filed by a member of a multidisciplinary team,1 stating that petitioner qualifies as a sexually violent predator.2 On its face, the report was made and signed by only one member of the team. A trial judge in Leon County found probable cause to detain petitioner under the act pending a trial to determine whether he should be held in civil confinement under the Act. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with this court, as he is being held at a facility of the Department of Children and Family Services within this district. Upon consideration, we entered an order requiring that he be released unless, within 72 hours a report is filed by all members of the multidisciplinary team finding that he meets the requirements for designation as a sexually violent predator. We now explain our rationale.

Although the Act has a broad purpose to protect the public from persons who are likely to inflict violence on persons in this state, the continued confinement of a person after he has served his full sentence for conviction of a crime is serious enough to warrant scrupulous compliance with the statute permitting such confinement, not to mention the applicable constitutional provisions. An evaluation by a multidisciplinary team is, even if not jurisdictional, certainly the predicate used in this case for commencing confinement under the Act. It seems little enough for us to read the statute as requiring that both members of the team join in the assessment. Under the statute the critical inquiry will often be, as here, whether the subject “suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.”

As there does not appear to be much in the way of evidence to support the finding of probable cause to commit petitioner to this civil confinement other than the team’s report, it assumes great significance for the confinement of this petitioner under the Act. For these reasons we ordered compliance if he is to be so held.

The mere fact that the Act does not in its own terms authorize a court to order the release of a detainee for failure to comply with the Act, as the State argues in its motion for rehearing, is of course irrelevant. The Great Writ of Habeas Corpus was especially designed to test the legality of confinement, and the legislature has not sought to eliminate its uses — even assuming it could validly do so — under this Act.

GUNTHER and GROSS, JJ., concur. . See § 6, ch. 99-222, Laws of Fla., renumbering § 916.33 as § 394.913, and amending subsection (3)(e) to read:

“Within 45 days after receiving notice, there shall be a written assessment as to whether the person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator and a written recommendation, which shall be provided to the state attorney. The written recommendation shall be provided by the Department of Children and Family Services and shall include the written report of the multidisciplinary team.

The provisions of this section are not jurisdictional, and failure to comply with them in no way prevents the state attorney from proceeding against a person otherwise subject to the provisions of this part.”

. See § 916.32(9), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1998), defining “sexually violent predator” as one who has been convicted of a specified offense and who “suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.”


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2002)
    …ved his full sentence for conviction of a crime is serious enough to warrant scrupulous compliance with the statute permitting such confinement, not to mention the applicable eonsti-tutional provisions.” Johnson v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 747 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). In sum, if the word “shall” is not construed as mandatory, a serious question would arise as to whether the Ryce Act itself provides the proper constitutional protections to detainees, particularly as it has been applied t…
  • Kinder v. State, 779 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
    …his full sentence for conviction of a crime is serious enough to warrant scrupulous compliance with the statute permitting such confinement, not to mention the applicable constitutional provisions.” Johnson v. Department of Children & Family Servs., 747 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). In this case, the State neither complied with the requirements of the Act nor afforded Kinder even minimal due process. The Act provides no remedy for this violation. Kinder argues that the thirty-day time limit should be…
  • Tanguay v. State, 782 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
    …failure to comply with the requirements of the Act or to afford Tanguay even minimal constitutional protections is to order Tanguay’s release from custody pending his commitment hearing. See, e.g., Johnson v. Department of Children & Family Servs., 747 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that courts have inherent authority to order the release of a detainee when the State fails to scrupulously comply with the requirements of the Act or the applicable constitutional provisions); Kinder v. State, 25 Fla.L.…

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