CIRO TORRES, APPELLANT,
v.
ALINA LINCHETA, F/K/A ALINA TORRES, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court reversed the dissolution judgment and denial of the motion to set aside the marital settlement agreement because the alimony provision requiring the husband to pay his entire annual income was unconscionable absent findings of imputed income.
A marital settlement agreement requiring alimony payments equal to the husband's entire gross annual income is unconscionable where the trial court made no findings of imputed income and the husband was in failing health.
[1] A marital settlement agreement requiring alimony payments equal to the obligor's entire annual gross income is unconscionable absent trial court findings of imputed incom…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCiro Torres, an unrepresented husband in failing health with gross annual income of $36,000, executed a marital settlement agreement obligating him to…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Motion To Set Aside Marital Settlement Agreement cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The husband, Ciro Torres, appeals from the final judgment of dissolution of marriage and from the denial of his post-judgment motion to set aside the parties’ marital settlement agreement where the agreement was unconscionable and the product of overreaching. We reverse.
A review of the record shows that the husband, unrepresented by counsel, executed a marital settlement agreement wherein he agreed to pay alimony to the wife in the amount of $3,000 per month or $36,000 per year. We find that, absent any findings by the trial court of imputed income, this agreement is unconscionable as the husband is in failing health and his financial affidavit indicates that his total gross income is $36,000 per year. See McGregor v. McGregor, 447 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Ellis v. Ellis, 385 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Moss-Jacober v. Moss, 334 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. dismissed, 353 So. 2d 676 (Fla.1977).
Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment of dissolution of marriage and the denial of the husband’s post-judgment motion to set aside the marital settlement agreement and on remand, direct the trial court to conduct a full trial on the equitable distribution of marital assets and the husband’s ability to pay alimony.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
McKNIGHT v. State, 906 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…000) (“Both the First and Fourth Districts have held that double jeopardy bars prosecution under section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1991), because that section is subsumed by section 782.071(2), Florida Statutes (1991).”) (citing Pierce v. State, 744 So. 2d 1193, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Wright v. State, 573 So. 2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)).5 McKnight also cites Franklin v. State, 719 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), wherein the court stated that “[bjecause section 316.027 did not intend multiple…
-
Terranton Hunt v. State, 769 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…degree, ... Both the First and Fourth Districts have held that double jeopardy bars prosecution under section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1991), because that section is subsumed by section 782.071(2), Florida Statutes (1991). See Pierce v. State, 744 So. 2d 1193, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Wright v. State, 573 So. 2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). This analysis applies to the 1997 version of the vehicular homicide statute as well. Section 782.071 subsumes the requirement found in section 316.027 that the mot…
-
Colon v. State, 53 So. 3d 376 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…that the elements of leaving the scene of an accident with death in counts three and four are subsumed in the elements of vehicular homicide in counts one and two. See Hunt v. State, 769 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (citing Pierce v. State, 744 So. 2d 1193, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Wright v. State, 573 So. 2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)). The State contends that Colon’s dual convictions for vehicular homicide and one count of leaving the scene of an accident with death no longer violate double jeo…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ellen-Sue Moss-Jacober v. Moss, 334 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Kamphuis Excavators, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 447 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- McGREGOR v. McGREGOR, 447 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Ellis v. Ellis, 385 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)