JOSE FELIX MUNGUIA, APPELLANT,

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals from judgments of conviction and sentences for two counts of engaging in sexual acts with a minor while in a position of familial authority and one count of lewd assault on a child. We affirm.

The trial court acted within its discretion when it found the victim competent to testify. The court made the com petency ruling after first questioning the victim extensively and reviewing a psychological report. The findings contained in that report, and the victim’s responses to the trial court’s questions, provided a sufficient basis for the court to exercise its discretion. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of defendant’s motion to appoint an additional expert to interview and evaluate the victim. See Hudson v. State, 368 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for psychological examination after conducting a personal examination of the victim to determine victim’s competency to stand trial).1

We find no error in the trial court’s imposition of an upward departure sentence, supported by written findings, based upon the odious and repugnant nature of this crime, committed by this defendant. The defendant committed these assaults knowing full well that the victim had suffered egregious earlier abuse of the same nature; his foreknowledge took the crime beyond the bounds of repugnancy inherent in the crime itself. See Gopaul v. State, 536 So. 2d 296, 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (“The odious and repugnant manner in which a crime is committed may represent a valid reason for departure.”).

AFFIRMED.

SCHWARTZ, C.J., and JORGENSON, J., concur. COPE, J., concurs.

. As to the remaining point relating to the conviction itself — the jury selection — we find no error.

COPE, J.

(concurring).

I join the opinion regarding the claim of trial error but specially concur with regard to the sentence departure.

While the minor child was residing with the mother, the child was sexually assaulted by two uncles and a grandfather. The uncles and grandfather were prosecuted. The defendant, who is the father, knew this had happened and was a witness at one of the trials.

Because of these unfortunate circumstances, custody was transferred to the defendant father. Plainly the entire purpose of changing custody was to place the child in an environment where she would be protected from any further sexual abuse. The protector then became the abuser. Having been placed with defendant in a supposedly safe environment, the child was subjected to the horrendous circumstance of experiencing further abuse, this time from the defendant — the very one who was supposed to be affording protection.

A sentence departure cannot be based on “the odious and repugnant nature of this crime,” opinion at 2, because the nature of the crime (sexual battery by a person in a position of familial or custodial authority) is deemed to have been factored into the sentencing guidelines. See Wilson v. State, 567 So. 2d 425 (Fla.1990). However, I concur that “the odious and repugnant manner in which a crime is committed may represent a valid reason for departure,” Gopaul v. State, 536 So. 2d 296, 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (emphasis added), and that the factual circumstances of this case justify departure.