DJUANA GARVEY, N/K/A DJUANA GARVEY SPARKS, APPELLANT,
v.
JEAN BARNES, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1999-09-10
No. 98-00686
WHATLEY and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.
742 So. 2d 420 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1999) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Djuana Garvey Sparks appealed a judgment in a personal injury action arising from a three-vehicle automobile accident, arguing that the jury's apportionment of fault was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of her motion for new trial, finding that the evidence supported the jury's 40%-60% fault allocation between Sparks and the third-vehicle driver Morrell.


Holding

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for new trial. The evidence supported the jury's finding that Sparks was 40% at fault and Morrell was 60% at fault.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a new trial when the jury's apportionment of fault is supported by the evidence.

[2] A jury's apportionment of fault will be upheld on appeal if it is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.

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Key Quotes

“She asserts in this appeal that the trial judge erred in denying her motion for new trial because the jury's apportionment of fault is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.”

States the central legal issue on appeal regarding whether the jury's fault allocation was supported by evidence.

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Facts & Procedural History

Three vehicles were traveling westbound on Drew Street approaching a T-intersection with Evergreen. Sparks, driving the first vehicle, came to a compl…

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Opinion of the Court
CAMPBELL, Acting Chief Judge.

CAMPBELL, Acting Chief Judge.

Appellant, Djuana Garvey Sparks, challenges the final judgment entered against her below in a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident. She asserts in this appeal that the trial judge erred in denying her motion for new trial because the jury’s apportionment of fault is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for new trial and accordingly affirm.

The motor vehicle accident which resulted in the final judgment that is the subject of Sparks’s challenge involved three vehicles. Sparks was driving westbound on Drew Street, a four-lane road with two lanes in each direction. She was driving in the inside left lane of Drew Street and approached the “T” intersection of Drew Street and Evergreen with the intention of making a left turn onto Evergreen. Drew Street has no turn lane for turning onto Evergreen. Appellee, Jean Barnes, was driving behind Sparks, also in the inside lane of Drew Street. Barnes testified that Sparks’s vehicle came to a complete stop in the left-hand lane without any warning, Sparks’s brake lights did not come on, and her left turn signal did not come on until Sparks had come to a complete stop. Barnes testified that she slammed on her brakes as hard as she could, causing her tires to screech. Barnes believed she was going to strike Sparks’s vehicle, but was able to stop approximately four feet behind Sparks. After Barnes stopped, she looked in her rearview mirror and saw the third vehicle driven by George Morrell coming up behind her. Morrell was unable to stop before colliding with the rear of Barnes’s vehicle. The collision propelled Barnes into the back of Sparks’s vehicle. Barnes estimated that Morrell had only one or two seconds of warning, and testified that Sparks’s actions led to the accident because Sparks did not give advance warning of stopping or of her intention to turn left.

Morrell testified that he observed the two cars in front of him stopping abruptly, “the first car and then the second car last.” Morrell testified that he was fully attentive to the driving conditions in front of him when he noticed the sudden stopping of the other vehicles but there was nothing he could have done to avoid the accident. There was evidence that all three vehicles were moving at approximately 35 m.p.h. as they descended the hill on Drew Street and approached the Evergreen “T” intersection, which is in the valley of the hill. Barnes was approximately three and one-half car lengths behind Sparks, and Mor-rell was approximately the same distance behind Barnes. There were no vehicles in front of Sparks. The deposition testimony of the driver of another vehicle that was approaching Evergreen on Drew from the opposite direction was introduced at trial and while this testimony conflicts to some degree with the testimony of Barnes and Morrell, it is not so manifestly conflicting as to support a new trial. The jury determined that Sparks was 40% at fault and Morrell was 60% at fault. The evidence supports that finding and we affirm.

WHATLEY and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Djuana Garvey Sparks v. Barnes, 755 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
    …CAMPBELL, Acting Chief Judge. This appeal is a companion to Sparks v. Barnes, 742 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) and arises from the proceeding below that grew out of the three-vehicle accident described in our opinion in that case issued simultaneously with this opinion. Appellant/eross-appellee Sparks, in this appeal, asserts that the awar…
  • OAK Cas. Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 744 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
    …PER CURIAM. Appellant/cross-appellee, Oak Casualty Insurance Company, and appellee/cross-appellant, Jean Barnes, address in this appeal the same issues we have determined in our opinions in Sparks v. Barnes, 742 So. 2d 420 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 1999) and Sparks v. Barnes, Case No. 98-03515, — So. 2d -, 1999 WL 770704 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. Sep. 19, 1999) issued simultaneously herewith. We affirm on this appeal and cross-appeal and refer readers to our opinions in the companion…

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