CSR PARTNERSHIP, A FLORIDA GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, AND PLAN C., INC., D/B/A CHILDREN'S THRIFT STORE, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In an eminent domain case, the court resolved whether the timing requirement for offers of judgment is governed by Florida's Civil Procedure Rules (45 days before trial) or by statute (20 days before trial). The court held that offer timing is procedural and therefore controlled by the Rules, not the statute, making the Department of Transportation's offer untimely.
The timing of an offer of judgment is procedural in nature and is controlled by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, which requires that an offer be served no later than forty-five days before trial. Therefore, the Department of Transportation's offer, which complied with the twenty-day statutory requirement but not the forty-five-day rule requirement, was untimely and invalid.
[1] The timing of an offer of judgment in an eminent domain case is procedural, not substantive.
[2] Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, which requires an offer to be served no later than forty-five days before trial, controls the timing of offers of judgment.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rule 1.442(a) states that it 'applies to all proposals for settlement authorized by Florida law, regardless of the terms used to refer to such offers, demands or proposals, and supersedes all other provisions of the rules and statutes that may be inconsistent with this rule.'”
Establishes that the procedural rule has broad applicability and explicitly supersedes conflicting statutes.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCSR Partnership and Plan C., Inc. (Children's Thrift Store) were parties to an eminent domain case against the Florida Department of Transportation. T…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Florida Rule Of Civil Procedure 1.442 cases and more on FLexlaw
BLUE, Judge.
The issue in this appeal is whether the timing of an offer of judgment in an eminent domain case is procedural or substantive. If procedural, the timing is controlled by the Florida Supreme Court’s adopted rule, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, which requires that an offer be served no later than forty-five days before trial. If substantive, section 73.032, Florida Statutes (1997), controls and requires that an offer be served no later than twenty days before trial. • The trial court held that the statute controlled and found, therefore, that the Department of Transportation’s offer was timely and valid. But we conclude the timing of an offer is procedural in nature and the rule controls so that the Department’s offer in this case was untimely. Accordingly, we reverse. Based on our disposition of this issue, we do not reach the merits of the second issue on appeal.
In addressing offers of judgment in civil actions, the supreme court has previously found that time limits for offers of judgment are procedural. See Knealing v. Puleo, 675 So. 2d 593, 596 (Fla.1996) (citing The Florida Bar Re Amend, to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.442 (Offer of Judgment), 550 So. 2d 442, 443 (Fla.1989)). Rule 1.442(a) states that it “applies to all proposals for settlement authorized by Florida law, regardless of the terms used to refer to such offers, demands or proposals, and supersedes all other provisions of the rules and statutes that may be inconsistent with this rule.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(a) (emphasis added). In the committee notes, it states that rule 1.442
was amended to reconcile, where possible, sections 44.102(6) (formerly 44.102(5)(b)), 45.061, 78.082, and 768.89, Florida Statutes, and the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court in Knealing v. Puleo, 675 So. 2d 593 (Fla.1996), TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla.1995), and Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1992). This rule ... supersedes those sections of the Florida Statutes and the prior decisions of the court, where reconciliation is impossible ....
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442 committee note (emphasis added). Because the differing time requirements between rule 1.442 and section 73.032 are impossible to reconcile, the rule must control.
Reversed and remanded.
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and CASANUEVA, J., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1995)
- Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1992)
- Knealing v. Puleo, 675 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1996)
- The Fla. Bar re: Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, 550 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1989)