GLORIA A. OSPINA, D.D.S., P.A., APPELLANT,
v.
SECURITY NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1999-06-30
No. 98-2310
Before GERSTEN, GODERICH and FLETCHER, JJ.
739 So. 2d 633 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1999) Caution
Cited by 7 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

In the underlying case, the trial court properly entered final summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Security National Insurance Company, as a matter of law. The law is well-settled that an insurance broker is generally the agent of the insured. Almerico v. RLI Ins. Co., 716 So. 2d 774 (Fla.1998).

Further, in the instant case, there was no record evidence that the insurance company took any action to lead the insured to believe that the insurance broker had actual or apparent authority as an agent of the carrier. Ruiz v. Fortune Ins. Co., 677 So. 2d 1336, 1338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); T & R Store Fixtures, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 621 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

As such, notice to the insurance broker of the insured’s acquisition of a replacement vehicle was insufficient to impute knowledge to the carrier.

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

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  • Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Callahan, 155 So. 3d 373 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)
    …unt of any assessments owed to the Associations. Central argues that notwithstanding Damas, the trial court had inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate its post-judgment motion for assessments. In support of its argument, Central cites Huml v. Collins, 739 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), where this Court held “a trial court always has the inherent jurisdiction to enforce its previously entered orders.” Central’s reliance on Huml is misplaced; Huml is a dissolution of marriage case, and “[cjourts retain juris…
  • Weaver v. Hotchkiss, 972 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
    …the circuit court reached the conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction in the matter. The circuit court had inherent jurisdiction to enforce the dissolution judgment. See Smilack v. Smilack, 858 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Huml v. Collins, 739 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Seng v. Seng, 590 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). We may speculate that the judge who signed the order denying Mr. Weaver’s motion was presiding in a division of the circuit court other than the family court division…
  • Aurora Bank v. Cimbler, 166 So. 3d 921 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)
    …force its previously entered orders, by virtue of our granting the Bank’s petition for writ of certiorari, no further orders remain to be enforced; there remains no further judicial labor for the trial court in this case. See, e.g., Huml v. Collins, 739 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“It is axiomatic that a trial court always has the inherent jurisdiction to enforce its previously entered orders.”).4 We, therefore, grant the Bank’s petition for writ of prohibition and prohibit the trial court from furth…

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