BUSTER GRANTHAM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Buster Grantham appeals the revocation of his community control and resulting incarceration for armed trafficking in methamphetamine. The court affirms the revocation but requires entry of a formal written order, and affirms the inclusion of firearm enhancement points on the sentencing scoresheet as not prohibited by White v. State.
The court affirms the revocation of community control but requires a formal written order of revocation on remand. The eighteen firearm enhancement points are properly included because the reclassification under section 775.087(1) for weapon use and the sentencing enhancement under section 921.0014(1) for firearm use are separate statutory provisions that both apply when the charged offense does not require a weapon as an essential element.
[1] A trial court's memorandum of sentencing is insufficient to serve as a formal, written order of revocation.
[2] A felony offense can be reclassified and its penalty enhanced if a weapon, not necessarily a firearm, is used during its commission.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because trafficking in methamphetamine, armed or otherwise, is not an offense enumerated in section 775.087(2) and the carrying or possessing of a weapon or firearm is not an essential element of that offense, we conclude that the trial court properly reclassified the felony pursuant to section 775.087(1), resulting in an increase of sentencing points.”
Establishes the court's rationale that the weapon reclassification and firearm enhancement points are both properly applied as separate statutory provisions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGrantham pleaded nolo contendere to armed trafficking in methamphetamine for quantities between 28 and 200 grams, a first-degree felony in 1996. He us…
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ALTENBERND, Acting Chief Judge.
Buster Grantham appeals the order revoking his community control and the resulting sentence of incarceration. We affirm the order revoking community control for a violation of condition 10. On remand, the trial court must enter a formal, written order of revocation because the memorandum of sentencing in the file is insufficient to serve as that order. See Donley v. State, 557 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
Mr. Grantham also challenges the inclusion of eighteen points on his scoresheet for possession of a firearm during the commission of his crime. We conclude that these points are not prohibited by White v. State, 714 So. 2d 440 (Fla.1998), and affirm on this issue.
Mr. Grantham pleaded nolo contendere to the charge of “armed” trafficking in methamphetamine for events occurring in September 1996. In 1996, trafficking in methamphetamine, for a quantity more than 28 grams but less than 200 grams, was a first-degree felony. See § 893.135(l)(f)(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996).
Because Mr. Grantham used a weapon during the compiission of this trafficking offense, the crime was reclassified by one felony degree, and its penalty was enhanced by one sentencing level. See § 775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996).
It was not essential that the weapon be a firearm for this reclassification to occur.1 The trafficking offense could have been reclassified if a knife or any weapon had been used during the commission of the offense. Coincidentally, the resulting enhancement of the sentencing level adds eighteen points to Mr. Grantham’s score-sheet, which is the same number of points added for use of a firearm under section 921.0014(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996).
Mr. Grantham argues that the inclusion of the points attributable to the use of a weapon under section 775.087(1) prohibits the court from including the points for use of a firearm under section 921.0014(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996).
See also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.703(d)(19).
Because trafficking in methamphetamine, armed or otherwise, is not an offense enumerated in section 775.087(2) and the carrying or possessing of a weapon or firearm is not an essential element of that offense, we conclude that the trial court properly reclassified the felony pursuant to section 775.087(1), resulting in an increase of sentencing points. Because Mr. Grantham’s weapon of choice was a firearm, the sentence was further enhanced pursuant to section 921.0014(1) for use of a firearm.2 Unlike White, this is not a situation in which the carrying or possessing of a firearm was an essential element of the charged offense even after the offense was reclassified.
The trial court simply fulfilled the intent of the legislature that is expressed in these two separate statutes.
Affirmed with instructions.
GASANUEVA, J., and DANAHY, PAUL W., (Senior) Judge, Concur. . Indeed, the reclassification can occur if the defendant commits an aggravated battery without use of any weapon. See § 775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996).
. Even if we were to find error in the inclusion of these points, we are not convinced that we could provide relief. Our record does not reflect any objection to the scoresheet, either at the original sentencing or upon the revocation of community control. Mr. Grant-ham did not seek relief through Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b).
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Woods v. State, 987 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…(Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Sutton v. State, 838 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Gordon v. State, 827 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Braswell v. State, 804 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Monroe v. State, 760 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Grantham v. State, 735 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Peterson v. State, 730 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Donley v. State, 557 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). . This practice contradicts Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(a), which requires the use of standard forms for judg…
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Monroe v. State, 760 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…e Peterson v. State, 730 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). We issued yet another opinion, after Peterson and before the Tenth Circuit entered this order, holding Memos of Sentence inadequate to serve as orders of revocation. See Grantham v. State, 735 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (citing Donley, 557 So. 2d 943). [*290] This Memo of Sentence states that “court found deft violated cond # 4.” Condition 4 requires that a probationer not violate the law. In this record, the only violation of condition 4 th…
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Antoine Jelks v. State, 770 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Coley v. State, 479 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). We note that unusual sentencing documents may still raise jurisdictional concerns. See Monroe v. State, 760 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). See also Grantham v. State, 735 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Donley v. State, 557 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). . We note that the record in this case contains a level of disarray that is all too typical for appeals of sentences imposed on violation of probation or community control. Alt…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- White v. State, 714 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1998)
- Donley v. State, 557 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)