ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
L. O. FEAGIN, APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed interlocutory orders granting a temporary restraining order and denying dissolution of that order in a property dispute between a railroad company and a landowner. The court held that the complainant failed to allege the necessary prerequisites for equitable relief in a trespass case: admitted or established title and irreparable injury.
A court of equity lacks jurisdiction to enjoin a mere trespass on property unless two conditions concur: first, the complainant's title must be admitted or legally established, and second, the trespass must cause irreparable damage not susceptible of complete pecuniary compensation. The inadequacy of legal remedy is an indispensable prerequisite for equity jurisdiction in trespass cases.
“the rule in this jurisdiction is that two conditions must concur to give a court of equity jurisdiction to enjoin a mere trespass on property; first, the complainant's title must be admitted, or legally established; and second, the trespass must be of such a nature as to cause irreparable damage, not susceptible of complete pecuniary compensation.”
States the controlling standard for equity jurisdiction in trespass cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFeagin owned land traversed by a right-of-way easement occupied by Atlantic Coast Line Railroad. The railroad was extending its fence to encompass a 1…
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West, C. J.-
This appeal is from two interlocutory orders, one granting a temporary restraining order, the other denying a motion to dissolve the restraining order. The allegations of the bill summarized are that the complainant is the owner and in the possession of certain described lands which are traversed by and subject to an easement in the nature of a right-of-way which is actually occupied by the defendant; that the defendant is preparing to and actually engaged in extending its fence enclosing its right-of-way so as to embrace within it a strip of land 100 feet wide on each side of the center of its track, thereby appropriating a strip of complainant’s land lying on “either” side of the track, together with a valuable and expensive road constructed by complainant and shade and fruit trees planted along such road. By amendment it is alleged that the defendant pretends to have some title to the land it is attempting to take possession of, the exact nature of which is unknown to complainant, but it is alleged to be without foundation in law or equity.
The prayer is for a restraining order enjoining defendant from interfering with complainant’s possession and title, from changing the location of defendant’s fence as to take possession of any o£ complainant’s lands, to require it to disclose the nature and extent of any such right or title claimed by it to the premises, and for general relief.
The bill contains an allegation that no immediate remedy is afforded for the alleged injury. There is no allegation that complainant is without an adequate remedy at law or that it would suffer irreparable injury as a result of the alleged trespass.
The motion to dissolve was upon various grounds.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that two conditions must concur to give a court of equity jurisdiction to enjoin a mere trespass on property; first, the complainant’s title must be admitted, or legally established; and second, the trespass must be of such a nature as to cause irreparable damage, not susceptible of complete pecuniary compensation. The inadequacy of the legal remedy is the foundation and indispensable prerequisite for the interposition of chancery in such cases. Indian River Steamboat Co. v. East Coast Trans. Co., 28 Fla. 387, 10 South. Rep. 480; Carney v. Hadley, 32 Fla. 344, 14 South. Rep. 4; Woodford v. Alexander, 35 Fla. 333, 17 South. Rep. 658; Weeks v. Turner Lbr. Co., 53 Fla. 793, 44 South. Rep. 173; Charlotte Harbor, etc. Co. v. Lancaster, 70 Fla. 200, 69 South. Rep. 720.
Within the rule frequently reiterated by this court, the allegations of the bill are obviously insufficient to warrant the interposition of a court of equity in the. way of injunctive relief, so the orders appealed from are reversed.
Reversed.
Whitfield, Terrell and Strum, J. J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Binnicker v. Leeper, 138 Fla. 738 (Fla. 1939)…afforded by an action for damages. See Cowan v. Skinner, 52 Fla. 486, 42 Sou. 730, 11 An. Cases 452; Masser v. Landon Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 Sou. 79; Carney v. Hadley, 32 Fla. 344; 14 Sou. 4, 22 L. R. A. 233; A. C. L. Rwy. Co. v. Feagan, 90 Fla. 62, 105 Sou. 141. It appears that the dissolution of the restraining order which had been entered without notice and including in such order or dissolution an order restraining the defendants from committing the only acts of trespass to which, so far…
Authorities Cited
- Indian River Steamboat Co. v. E. Coast Transp. Co., 28 Fla. 387 (Fla. 1891)
- Carney v. Hadley, 32 Fla. 344 (Fla. 1893)
- Harbor v. Lancaster, 70 Fla. 200 (Fla. 1915)
- Weeks v. J. C. Turner Lumber Co., 53 Fla. 793 (Fla. 1907)
- Woodford v. Seigmore Alexander, 35 Fla. 333 (Fla. 1895)