GEREMI PIERCE, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1999-05-06
Nos. 94,053
SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur., HARDING, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion., WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.
734 So. 2d 399 Florida Supreme Court (1999) Negative Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon may stipulate to his prior felony conviction status, and the State and trial court must accept such stipulation rather than introduce evidence of the prior conviction. The decision overruled prior precedent in favor of the federal approach established in Old Chief v. United States.


Holding

Yes. When a criminal defendant offers to stipulate to the convicted felon element of a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the State and trial court must accept this stipulation. The introduction of Pierce's prior conviction evidence was not harmless error, warranting a new trial.


Headnotes

[1] A prior felony conviction used to establish the status element in a firearm possession case may be proven by stipulation when offered by the defendant, thereby precluding…

[2] The State and trial courts should accept a defendant's stipulation to convicted felon status in firearm violation cases when the defendant offers to stipulate without fur…

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Key Quotes

“when a criminal defendant offers to stipulate to the convicted felon element of a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon without further elaboration, the State and the trial court should accept this stipulation”

Establishes the core holding that stipulations to prior felony status must be accepted in firearm possession cases

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Facts & Procedural History

Geremi Pierce was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Prior to trial, Pierce offered to stipulate to his status as a convicted …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review a district court decision certifying the following question to be of great public importance:

SHOULD THE DECISION IN PARKER v. STATE, 408 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1982), BE OVERRULED IN FAVOR OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE EVI-DENTIARY REQUIREMENTS FOR PROOF OF CONVICTED FELON STATUS IN FIREARM VIOLATION CASES ESTABLISHED FOR FEDERAL COURTS IN OLD CHIEF v. UNITED STATES, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997)?

Pierce v. State, 23 Fla. L.Weekly D2051, - So. 2d -, 1998 WL 558760 (Fla. 2d DCA Sept. 4, 1998). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We recently answered this question affirmatively in Brown v. State, 719 So. 2d 882 (Fla.1998), wherein we held that when a criminal defendant offers to stipulate to the convicted felon element of a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon without further elaboration, the State and the trial court should accept this stipulation. Id. at 889. In our decision, we granted Brown relief because he timely objected to the introduction of his prior felony convictions into evidence, preserved the issue for appeal, and argued it to the district court and to this Court. See id. at 884 n. 1. We also stated that our decision was prospective only, except for pending cases where the issue has been preserved. Id. As the State concedes, Pierce has adequately preserved this issue for review by offering to stipulate to his status as a convicted felon prior to trial and by arguing it to the district court on appeal. Moreover, his case was pending in this Court when we rendered our decision in Brown.

As in Brown, we are unable to conclude that the introduction of Pierce’s prior conviction for robbery was harmless error. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).1 Therefore, in accordance with our opinion in Brown, we answer the certified question in the affirmative, quash the deci sion under review and remand for a new trial.

It is so ordered.

SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur. HARDING, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.

WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.

. In fact, the record reflects that Pierce not only contested the case, but also presented the testimony of other witnesses in support of his claim of innocence. Pierce also cites the prosecutor's argument to the judge at Pierce’s sentencing wherein the prosecutor stated that it was safe to assume that when a person like Pierce carries a gun, he does not do so for a lawful purpose.

Other
HARDING, C.J.,

HARDING, C.J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in part and dissent in part for the reasons stated in my concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion in Brown v. State, 719 So. 2d 882, 890 (Fla. 1998).

Dissent
WELLS, J.,

WELLS, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in Brown v. State, 719 So. 2d 882, 890 (Fla.1998).


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Citator

Cited By

  • Griffin v. State, 946 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …ing sections 775.083(2) and 939.185, Florida Statutes (2004)); Waller v. State, 911 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (involving section 939.18, Florida Statutes (2003)); Pierce v. State, 779 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), quashed on other grounds, 734 So. 2d 399 (Fla.1999) (involving costs for Juvenile Assessment Center and Teen Court Programs). We acknowledge that these cases do not contain a detailed analysis of the application of principles of ex post facto to costs that are enacted after a defendant co…
  • Hayden v. State, 753 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
    …ntil after the date of his offenses. See §§ 39.019 and 775.0833, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). Therefore, we strike these costs. See Pierce v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2051, - So. 2d -, 1998 WL 558760 (Fla. 2d DCA Sept.4, 1998), quashed on other grounds, 734 So. 2d 399 (Fla.1999). Affirmed in part, remanded for correetion of sentence, and costs stricken. GREEN and DAVIS, JJ„ Concur.…
  • Williams v. State, 749 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
    …924.051(7) merely reaffirms the existing standard of review which requires application of DiGuilio to errors that are not reversible per se. However, we think this case is controlled by Brown v. State, 719 So. 2d 882 (Fla.1998) and Pierce v. State, 734 So. 2d 399 (Fla.1999). In Brown, the Florida Supreme Court established a new rule that when a criminal defendant offers to stipulate to the convicted felon element of a felon in possession of a firearm charge, the court must accept the stipulation. The identit…

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