PATRICIO SANTIAGO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Santiago appealed his conviction for driving with a suspended license, arguing he should have been convicted of a first degree misdemeanor rather than a third degree felony. The court found the trial court applied an incorrect version of the statute and remanded for reconsideration under the proper statute in effect at the time of conviction.
The trial court erred by applying the 1997 version of section 322.34, which did not take effect until after Santiago's conviction. Under the 1995 version in effect at the time of his conviction, a first conviction for driving with a revoked license as a habitual offender was a first degree misdemeanor.
[1] A court must apply the statutory version in effect at the time of the offense when determining the classification of a crime.
[2] Driving with a revoked habitual offender license may constitute a first-degree misdemeanor upon a first conviction under the 1995 version of Florida Statutes section 322.…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the trial court did not apply the correct version of the statute, we remand for reconsideration.”
Establishes the core issue and remedy—the trial court applied the wrong statutory version
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSantiago was convicted on March 5, 1997 for driving with his license revoked as a habitual traffic offender. The trial court applied section 322.34(5)…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Habitual Traffic Offender cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Patricio' Santiago raised five issues in his motion for postconviction relief. The trial court summarily denied Mr. Santiago’s motion and he appealed. We find that only one issue merits discussion: Mr. Santiago contends that, under section 322.34, Florida Statutes, he should have been convicted of a first degree misdemeanor rather than of a third degree felony. Because the trial court did not apply the correct version of the statute, we remand for reconsideration. We otherwise affirm the order denying Mr. Santiago’s motion for postconviction relief.
In his motion for postconviction relief, Mr. Santiago alleged that his conviction for driving with his license suspended or revoked was a first degree misdemeanor because it was his first conviction after having had his license revoked as a habitual traffic offender. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (1997), makes it a third degree felony to drive in Florida after a person has had a license revoked as a habitual traffic offender. The 1997 version of the statute did not, however, go into effect until October 1, 1997. See Ch. 97-300, § 40, at 5414, § 54, at 5421, Laws of Fla. According to Mr. Santiago’s motion, he was convicted on March 5,1997.
Under the earlier version of the statute, Mr. Santiago may have a legitimate claim that he should have been convicted of only a first degree misdemeanor. See State v. Harvey, 693 So. 2d 1009, 1010-11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1995), reads as follows: -
(1) Any person whose driver’s license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s. 322.26U, and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon:
(a) A first conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(b) A second conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) Any person whose driver’s license has been revoked pursuant to s. 322.264-(habitual offender) and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked upon:
(a) A first conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(b) A second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(Emphasis supplied.) We therefore remand for reconsideration under the appropriate version of section 322.34, Florida Statutes.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
MINER, BENTON, and BROWNING, JJ., CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Deatherage v. State, 15 So. 3d 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…ishment for any crime previously committed.”); Castle v. State, 330 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla.1976) (holding that a defendant was not entitled to be sentenced under a later enacted statute that reduced the maximum penalty for his crime); Santiago v. State, 731 So. 2d 787, 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding that an amendment changing the predicate for a felony offense under section 322.34 did not apply retroactively); see also State v. Battle, 661 So. 2d 38, 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (“The controlling statute for punishmen…
-
Marusak v. State, 789 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…da Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm the trial court’s order without discussion. However, there may be a problem with the legality of Marusak’s conviction which is not refuted by the limited record before this court. See Santiago v. State, 731 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding a new version of section 322.34 did not apply retroactively to a defendant who committed his offense prior to the statute’s effective date). Therefore, this affirmance is without prejudice to the filing by Marusak of a m…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Oberlin D. Harvey, 693 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)