REGINALD LEE, PETITIONER,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Parole Commission revoked Lee's conditional release based on two alleged violations: unauthorized contact with Ms. Thompson and tardiness in reporting. On review, the circuit court found insufficient evidence for the contact violation but upheld revocation based solely on tardiness. The appellate court granted certiorari and remanded because the circuit court failed to remand to the Parole Commission to determine whether tardiness alone warranted revocation.
The circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law by failing to remand the case to the Florida Parole Commission so that it could consider in the first instance whether tardiness alone warranted revocation of conditional release.
[1] A court departs from the essential requirements of law by failing to remand a case to an administrative body for reconsideration of sanctions when a portion of the basis…
[2] When a court invalidates one of multiple grounds for revocation of conditional release, it must remand to the administrative body to determine if the remaining grounds al…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Having so ruled, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law in failing to remand the case to the Florida Parole Commission, so the Commission could consider, in the first instance, whether the tardiness alone warranted revocation.”
States the core holding that the circuit court erred by not remanding to the Parole Commission to consider the remaining violation independently.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLee was under conditional release with two conditions: no contact with Ms. Thompson and timely reporting to his conditional release officer by noon on…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Revocation Of Release cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Mr. Lee was charged with violating two conditions of his conditional release: the condition that he have no contact with a Ms. Thompson, and the condition that he obey the directions of his conditional release officer, viz., reporting by noon on a date certain. While Mr. Lee concedes that he did not appear at noon, he contends he was only an hour late. The record reveals he may have been as much as two hours late, but also reflects that he contacted his conditional release officer by telephone prior to his tardy appearance. The Florida Parole Commission found both violations had occurred and revoked conditional release.
On review, the circuit court ruled that the only evidence of contact with Ms. Thompson was hearsay. The circuit court nevertheless upheld revocation on the ground that Mr. Lee admitted to arriving late for his noon appointment. The circuit court’s ruling that no competent evidence supported the finding of any violation other than tardiness has not been questioned here. Having so ruled, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law in failing to remand the case to the Florida Parole Commission, so the Commission could consider, in the first instance, whether the tardiness alone warranted revocation.
We therefore grant the petition for writ of certiorari and remand, with directions that the trial court remand to the Florida Parole Commission for further proceedings. Compare Ross v. State, 701 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (remanding because record did not reveal if court would have revoked based on second violation alone); Llumbet v. State, 698 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (remanding because it could not be told from record if the court would have revoked community control based solely on the remaining two violations); with Griffin v. State, 719 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (declining to remand because the remaining violation was clearly the most serious of the charged violations); Smith v. State, 705 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (declining to remand because comments in the record made it clear the court would still have revoked based on just one violation).
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted.
ERVIN, BOOTH, and BENTON, JJ., CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Carswell v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 861 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…ommission fails to show that it would have revoked appellant’s conditional release supervision solely on a violation of condition 2(c), then, the circuit court shall remand to the Commission for further proceedings. See Lee v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 730 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). ERVIN, BOOTH and KAHN, JJ., concur.…
-
Carswell v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 924 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…d still have revoked petitioner’s conditional release supervision solely on the basis of condition 2(c), we remand with directions that the circuit court remand to the Florida Parole Commission for further proceedings. See Lee v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 730 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). BARFIELD, BROWNING and THOMAS, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Smith v. State, 705 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- Llumbet v. State, 698 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Ross v. State, 701 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Griffin v. State, 719 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Mahoney v. Uladislao Diaz and Kyong Diaz, 719 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)