FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, APPELLANT,
v.
EILEEN BLOCKER; UNKNOWN TENANT(S), BERNARD J. O'CONNOR, MILLICENT A. LINDNER AND JAMES D. COOLEY, INDIVIDUALLY, AND D/B/A TROPICAL PEST CONTROL, APPELLEES
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Florida appellate court quashed a trial court's sua sponte order staying an entire mortgage foreclosure action pending arbitration of a separate action to which the foreclosing party was not a party, finding the order granted unrequested relief in violation of due process.
A trial court may not sua sponte stay an entire foreclosure action pending arbitration in a separate action without notice to and litigation by all parties, as such action violates due process and constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law.
[1] A trial court lacks authority to sua sponte stay an entire foreclosure action pending arbitration in a separate action to which the foreclosing party is not a party, abse…
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Court's explanation of why the stay order violated due process requirements
FNMA filed a 1997 foreclosure action against a mortgagor who had filed a third-party complaint against sellers and an inspector. The sellers moved to …
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BARFIELD, C.J.
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) appeals an order staying a mortgage foreclosure action pending the outcome of arbitration in a related action to which FNMA is not a party. We treat the initial brief, together with FNMA’s response to our order to show cause, as a petition for writ of certiorari.
In the 1997 foreclosure action, the defendant mortgagor had filed a third-party complaint against the sellers and an inspector upon whose report the mortgagor had relied in purchasing the property. The sellers filed a motion seeking a stay of the third-party action pending arbitration of a separate 1995 action involving the same parties and essentially the same issues as the third-party action. After a hearing on this motion, the trial court issued an order sua sponte staying the entire foreclosure action pending the outcome of arbitration in the 1995 action in order to conserve “litigant and judicial resources.” FNMA’s motion for reconsideration, asserting that no party had requested a stay of the entire action, was denied. We find that the trial court’s order granted relief that was not requested, noticed, nor litigated by any party. See Kerrigan, Estess, Rankin & McLeod v. State, 711 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), and the eases cited therein. This denial of due process constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law, for which FNMA has no adequate remedy .on appeal from the final judgment in the case. The order is therefore QUASHED and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
ERVIN and JOANOS, JJ„ CONCUR.
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Fla. Dep't of Child. & Families v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D442 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)…non-party to underlying criminal case, would suffer irreparable harm and had no other adequate remedy). The trial court’s order granted relief that was not requested or noticed for hearing by either party.1 See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Blocker, 728 So. 2d 306, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Kerrigan, Estess, Rankin & McLeod v. State, 711 So. 2d 1246, 1248-49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), and the cases cited therein. “We have previously held that ‘the granting 1 Neither of the parties has taken a position on the merit…
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- Kerrigan v. State, 711 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)