STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ON BEHALF OF PATRICIA BAKER, APPELLANT,
v.
TONY SULLIVAN, APPELLEE
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The Florida Department of Revenue and a child's mother appealed a trial court order that relieved the father, Tony Sullivan, of his child support obligations based on a private blood test showing he was not the biological father. The appellate court reversed, holding that a paternity judgment more than one year old is final and cannot be set aside absent fraud, and that established child support arrearages cannot be relieved without exceptional circumstances or compliance with procedural rules.
The trial court erred in setting aside the paternity judgment and relieving Sullivan of his child support obligations. Absent fraud on the court, a paternity judgment becomes final after one year and cannot be reopened. Additionally, established child support arrearages may only be reduced upon a showing of exceptional circumstances or pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), and child support modifications require a substantial change in circumstances.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to set aside a judgment of paternity more than one year after its rendition absent a showing of fraud on the court.
[2] A paternity adjudication is res judicata and cannot be set aside based solely on a private blood test suggesting non-paternity when the judgment is more than one year old…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“absent fraud on the court, a trial court does not have jurisdiction to set aside a judgment of paternity more than one year after its rendition, even where a private blood test suggests that the party is not the biological father”
Establishes the primary legal standard that paternity judgments become final and cannot be reopened based on biological evidence alone
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA final judgment of paternity was entered on January 17, 1986, establishing Tony Sullivan as the legal and biological father with a duty to support th…
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WHATLEY, Judge.
The State of Florida, Department of Revenue, and Patricia Baker, the mother, appeal an order setting aside Tony Sullivan’s child support obligation. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Sullivan was not the biological father of the child and in relieving Sullivan from any obligation to pay child support. We therefore reverse.
A final judgment of paternity was entered on January 17, 1986, which found that Sullivan was the legal and biological father of the child and that he had a duty to support the child.
On December 10,1996, Sullivan filed a request asking the trial court to relieve him of his obligation to pay child support. Sullivan alleged that a private blood test showed that he was not the biological father of the child. After a hearing, the trial court found that, because Sullivan was not the biological father of the child, Sullivan .“is relieved of any obligation to pay child support, arrears, or retroactive child support in this matter.” This was error. In DeVaughn v. Department of Revenue, 691 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 700 So. 2d 684 (Fla.1997), the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that, absent fraud on the court, a trial court does not have jurisdiction to set aside a judgment of paternity more than one year after its rendition, even where a private blood test suggests that the party is not the biological fáther. 691 So. 2d at 12. See Lathrop v. Lathrop, 627 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Miller v. Cowart, 546 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
In the present case,, there was no showing of fraud on the court.
Therefore, it was error for the trial court to find that Sullivan was not the biological father of the child. The paternity adjudication was res judicata. See DeVaughn; Miller.
The trial court also erred in relieving Sullivan of his obligation to pay past or future child support obligations and established arrearages. Once a trial court establishes arrearages in a judgment, those ar-rearages may only be reduced where there is a showing of exceptional circumstances or a party files a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). See Duncan v. Duncan, 598 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Here, there is no evidence that the trial court considered either of these two factors before relieving Sullivan of his obligation to pay established arrearages.
Further, a trial court may modify child support only when there has been a substantial change in the parties’ circumstances. See Fisher v. Fisher, 722 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Here, there was no showing of a substantial change in the parties’ circumstances. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to relieve Sullivan of his child support obligations. Accordingly, we reverse the order relieving Sullivan of his obligation to pay child support and established arrearages and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
PARKER, C.J., and CASANUEVA, J., Concur.
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Robbie Lefler v. Lefler, 776 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…ue of a fraud upon the court,” reasoning that “Ed-den had reason to believe that he was not the biological father, and thus had the opportunity to defend against [the moth [*323] er’s] allegations.” Id. at 438. See also Dep’t of Revenue v. Sullivan, 727 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Vereen v. Vereen, 581 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Here, as in Edden, if any fraud existed, it was not extrinsic and could not form the basis for overturning the judgment more than one year after rendition. See also Dep’t of…
Authorities Cited
- Michelle Miller & the Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cowart, 546 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Alphonso S. DeVAUGHN v. Dep't OF Revenue & Clara Brown, 691 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Fisher v. Fisher, 722 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Thompson v. State, 598 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Duncan v. Duncan, 598 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Lathrop v. Dorinda E. Lathrop, 627 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Eaton v. Gurry, 627 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)