BEGONIA CORPORATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND PHILIP SCHWAB, APPELLANTS,
v.
NAM FINANCIAL CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1999-01-27
No. 98-3196
KLEIN and STEVENSON, JJ, concur.
724 So. 2d 714 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1999) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Begonia Corporation and Philip Schwab appealed a sanctions order for $100,000 imposed for conspiring to frustrate foreclosure sale orders. The appellate court reversed the trial court's refusal to allow a supersedeas bond for the sanctions, holding that sanctions orders requiring payment of a fixed sum are bondable even when arising from foreclosure proceedings.


Holding

Appellants are entitled to post a supersedeas bond for the sanctions order. Although the underlying foreclosure judgment is not solely for payment of money, the sanctions order itself is essentially a judgment requiring payment of a fixed sum and therefore qualifies for bonding under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(1).


Headnotes

[1] A sanctions order arising from a collateral proceeding in a foreclosure action may be considered a judgment solely for the payment of money for the purpose of posting a s…

[2] A party is entitled to bond a sanctions order that requires the payment of a fixed sum of money, even if the order lacks language allowing immediate execution.

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Key Quotes

“The sanctions order arose from a collateral proceeding in the foreclosure action. Thus, while the final judgment of foreclosure itself may not have been "solely for the payment of money", see Fla.R.App.P. 9.310(b)(1), the sanctions order is reasonably understood as such a judgment.”

Establishes that sanctions orders in foreclosure actions can be distinguished from the underlying judgment and analyzed separately for bonding purposes.

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Facts & Procedural History

After the appellate court previously affirmed a foreclosure judgment (except for a prepayment penalty), the trial court scheduled a sale. Two sales fa…

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Opinion of the Court
FARMER, J.

FARMER, J.

On Motion To Review Denial Of Stay Pending Review

Appellants seek review of an order imposing sanctions against them for frustrating orders of the court relating to a sale under a final judgment of foreclosure of property in which they have an interest. They previously appealed the foreclosure judgment, and we affirmed it except for a prepayment penalty. Begonia Corp. v. Nam Fin. Corp., 710 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), reh’g denied (Mar. 30, 1998).

After our remand there were further proceedings to amend the judgment and have a sale. One sale was set aside and a new one scheduled. A second sale failed because the successful bidder defaulted on a deposit. A new sale was then scheduled but additional proceedings intervened, which resulted in an order of the trial court finding that appellants had conspired with third parties to frustrate the orders of the court relating to the sale. The order awarded appellee the sum of $100,000 as sanctions against appellants.

Appellants thereafter sought a supersede-as bond as to the amount of the sanctions imposed against them, but the trial judge refused to set or allow such a bond and thus any stay pending review. Upon the filing of the motion to review the refusal to allow a bond, we stayed further proceedings, including the sale, pending our review of the issues relating to the stay.

Having now considered the matter, we vacate any stay as to the sale under the final judgment of foreclosure but reverse the order refusing to set a supersedeas bond as to the amount of the sanctions. The sanctions order arose from a collateral proceeding in the foreclosure action. Thus, while the final judgment of foreclosure itself may not have been “solely for the payment of money”, see Fla.R.App.P. 9.310(b)(1), the sanctions order is reasonably understood as such a judgment. That being so, appellants are entitled to bond the sanctions order while they pursue their appeal of it. The fact that the order lacks words allowing immediate execution does not remove it from the realm of orders essentially requiring the payment of a fixed sum of money.

We remand with instructions to set a su-persedeas bond as a condition of the stay of the sanctions order in accordance with rule 9.310(b)(1). The sale shall proceed as the trial court may provide by appropriate order. KLEIN and STEVENSON, JJ, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …(Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Palm Beach Heights Dev. & Sales Corp. v. Decillis, 385 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); see also PS Capital, LLC v. Palm Springs [*998] Town Homes, LLC, 9 So. 3d 643, 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Begonia Corp. v. NAM Fin. Corp., 724 So. 2d 714, 714 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Zuckerman v. Hofrichter & Quiat, P.A., 622 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Dice v. Cameron, 424 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).1 Thus, today’s decision by the Majority to not accept jurisdiction results in a state judi…

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