DEMITRIUS BELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Demitrius Bell appeals his convictions for driving with a suspended license, resisting arrest with violence, possession of cannabis, and battery on law enforcement officers. Although the court affirms the convictions, it addresses and criticizes improper prosecutorial comments made during closing argument, expressing concern about counsel's disregard for harmless error and fundamental error doctrines.
The court affirmed Bell's convictions despite finding that the prosecutor made improper comments. The trial court erred in overruling Bell's objection to the comment about the jury trial right, but this single comment was harmless error. The unobjected-to comments were not preserved for review and do not constitute fundamental error, making affirmance necessary despite the impropriety of the arguments.
[1] A prosecutor's comment that the defendant's exercise of the right to a jury trial is the sole reason for the proceedings, while improper, may not warrant reversal if it d…
[2] Unobjected-to prosecutorial comments during closing argument do not constitute reversible error unless they rise to the level of fundamental error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the prosecutor vouched for the truthfulness of the officers, told the jury to send Bell a message, argued matters not in evidence, and commented on Bell's exercise of his right to a jury trial”
Identifies the specific improper prosecutorial comments that were the subject of the appeal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBell was convicted of driving with a suspended license, resisting arrest with violence, possession of cannabis, and three counts of battery on a law e…
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FULMER, Judge.
Demitrius Bell appeals his convictions for driving with a suspended license, resisting arrest with violence, possession of cannabis, and three counts of battery on a law enforce ment officer. While we affirm the convictions, we write to address the issue raised concerning improper comments of the prosecutor during closing argument.
The record reflects that the prosecutor vouched for the truthfulness of the officers, told the jury to send Bell a message, argued matters not in evidence, and commented on Bell’s exercise of his right to a jury trial. Bell failed to preserve for review the alleged error concerning most of these comments. See Parker v. State, 705 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Bell did object and request a curative instruction when the prosecutor told the jury that the “only one reason we’re here” was because Bell had a right to a jury trial. Although the trial court erred in overruling the objection, this comment alone was not so harmful as to survive a harmless error analysis. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986). Furthermore, we conclude that the unobjected-to comments do not constitute fundamental error. See Mordenti v. State, 630 So. 2d 1080 (Fla.1994). Consequently, we are compelled to affirm. However, our affirmance should not be construed as approval of the remarks made by the prosecutor. We continue to be concerned when trial counsel make improper arguments to a jury. At times it seems as if certain counsel consider the harmless and fundamental error rules to be a license to violate both the substantive law and the ethical rules that prohibit improper argument. We reiterate the admonition of Judge Blue in his specially concurring opinion in Luce v. State, 642 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994): “Trial attorneys must avoid improper argument if the system is to work properly. If attorneys do not recognize improper argument, they should not be in a courtroom. If trial attorneys recognize improper argument and persist in its use, they should not be members of The Florida Bar.”
Affirmed.
QUINCE, J., concurs.
ALTENBERND, Acting Chief Judge, concurs specially.
concurring.
Both defense attorneys and prosecutors make improper closing arguments in criminal cases. Because of the nature of appellate process, and in light of the doctrine of double jeopardy, we primarily review prosecutorial misconduct. In the final analysis, however, appellate courts have little practical ability to police misconduct in closing arguments by either prosecutors or defense attorneys.
There are about a dozen bad tactics that this court sees with regularity in closing arguments. I am increasingly convinced that the state attorneys, the public defenders, and the circuit court judges, at a statewide level, need to create a continuing legal education videotape for prosecutors and a separate videotape for defense attorneys, demonstrating improper closing arguments that are against the rules and should never be made. Each new attorney who practices in criminal court should be required to view these tapes before the attorney is allowed to try a case. When an attorney violates the rules for the first time in closing argument, the trial judge should be encouraged to require the attorney to view the tape again. After two or three viewings, if an attorney still cannot argue within the rules, other more serious sanctions should be imposed either by a supervising attorney or by the trial court. Given the seriousness of these trials and the ramifications of appellate court reversals, the public, the victims of crime, and the defendants deserve no less.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Evans v. State, 177 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2015)…he defense. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion for mistrial. No objection was raised to the second comment. It is improper for a prosecutor to comment on a defendant’s exercise of his right to a jury trial. Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that the trial court erred when it overruled an objection to the prosecutor’s comment that the “only one reason we’re here” was because the defendant had the right to a jury trial); Johns v. State, 832 So. 2d 959, 96…
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D'Ambrosio v. State, 736 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…to find reversible error; court nonetheless found as fundamental error repeated comments of prosecutor belittling defense witnesses and defendant with terms such as “pathetic,” “insulting,” “preposterous,” “nonsense,” and “bologna.”); Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (prosecutor’s vouching of officer’s testimony, telling jury to send a message, argument of matters not in evidence, and comment on defendant’s exercise of his right to a jury trial did not constitute fundamental error; Judge Alten…
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Johns v. State, 832 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…ses or defendants as examples of a certain criminal type. Perez v. State, 689 So. 2d 306, 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). The State then went on to disparage Johns for having exercised his right to trial. This too is an improper argument. See Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Next, the State vouched for the credibility of the law enforcement officers who testified. This again is an improper argument. Brown v. State, 787 So. 2d 229, 230 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Finally, the State’s arguments that denigrated…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Mordenti v. State, 630 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1994)
- Luce v. State, 642 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Parker v. State, 705 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)