CORY PEE, BY AND THROUGH HIS PARENT AND NEXT FRIENDS, DOVIE MILTON AND DOVIE MILTON, INDIVIDUALLY,, PETITIONERS,
v.
ARNOLD H. AARON, D.O., INDIVIDUALLY AND ARNOLD H. AARON, D.O., P.A., A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, D/B/A FAMILY MEDICINE ASSOCIATES AND CITY OF POMPANO BEACH, FLORIDA, D/B/A POMPANO BEACH FIRE-RESCUE AND HEALTH OPTIONS, RESPONDENTS
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A Florida appellate court quashed a trial court order that compelled plaintiff's counsel to accept fax transmissions from opposing counsel. The court held that while Rule 1.080(b) authorizes service by fax as a supplemental method, it does not require counsel to accept faxes, and courts cannot compel counsel to utilize fax machines for legal correspondence.
A trial court cannot compel counsel to accept fax transmissions. Although Rule 1.080(b)(5) authorizes service by fax, it only permits fax service if copies are also served by another authorized method—fax service alone is not authorized. Counsel cannot be compelled to utilize fax machines for sending or receiving documents in litigation.
[1] A court cannot compel a party's counsel to accept service of documents via fax transmission when counsel has a policy against receiving such transmissions from opposing c…
[2] Service by fax under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080(b)(5) is only authorized when copies are also served by another permitted method; service by fax alone is not a…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although it is true that rule 1.080(b)(5) authorizes service by fax, the rule only authorizes it if copies are also served by some other method permitted by the rule. Service by fax alone is not authorized.”
Establishes that fax service under the rule is supplemental only and cannot be used as the sole method of service.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefense counsel attempted to fax a letter to plaintiff's counsel but was informed that plaintiff's counsel does not accept faxes from opposing counsel…
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KLEIN, Judge.
The trial court granted a motion filed by the defendants to “compel plaintiff to accept faxed transmissions.” We grant plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certiorari and quash the order. . Defendants’ motion alleged that when defense counsel attempted to fax a letter to plaintiffs’ counsel, defense counsel was advised that plaintiffs’ counsel does not accept faxes from opposing counsel. The motion further alleged that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080(b) authorizes service by fax and requested that the court either compel plaintiffs’ counsel to accept faxes and correspondence, or in the alternative be prohibited from sending faxes to counsel in this case.
In his petition for certiorari, plaintiffs’ counsel alleges that he has a policy of not utilizing his fax machine for transmitting or receiving documents from opposing counsel in all cases because of “counsel constantly and continually sending argumentative letters, non-emergency pleadings, and other materials over the fax, which constantly and continuously interrupted his working day.” We conclude that the order compelling plaintiffs’ counsel to accept faxes is a departure from the essential requirements of law for which there will be no adequate remedy by appeal from final judgment.
Although it is true that rule 1.080(b)(5) authorizes service by fax, the rule only authorizes it if copies are also served by some other method permitted by the rule. Service by fax alone is not authorized. .The defendant has provided us with no authority, nor any other reason, why counsel who do not wish to send or receive documents by fax should be compelled to receive them. Clearly a court could not require counsel who does not have a fax machine to obtain one. By like token, we see no reason why counsel who has a machine, but does not wish to use it to send or receive in a lawsuit, should be compelled to do so. We therefore quash the order. POLEN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.