DON R. TYLER, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA-GOVERNOR LAWTON CHILES AND DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE-TOM GALLAGHER, AND FLORIDA DIVISION OF RISK MANAGEMENT-DIRECTOR R.J. CASTELLANOS, AND FLORIDA DIVISION OF INSURANCE FRAUD-DIRECTOR FRANK DOOLITTLE, AND FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES-COMMISSIONER BOB CRAWFORD, AND FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY-DIRECTOR L. EARL PETERSON, AND CRAWFORD AND COMPANY-CEO FORREST MINNIX, AND WILLIAM L. EARP, M.D., AND WILLIAM A. FRIEDMAN, M.D., AND J. MASON WINES, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1997-11-19

No. 96-04302

PARKER, C.J., and PATTERSON and NORTHCUTT, JJ., concur.

718 So. 2d 811 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1997) Positive Treatment

Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Don Tyler appealed the dismissal of his second amended complaint, but the Florida District Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Tyler filed his notice of appeal 70 days after the trial court's final order, exceeding the 30-day jurisdictional deadline under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b).

Holding

The appellate court lacks jurisdiction and dismisses the appeal because Tyler failed to file his notice of appeal within 30 days of the trial court's final order, as required by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b). The rendition date was July 22, 1996 (when Judge Young's order was filed), making Tyler's September 30, 1996 notice of appeal untimely.

Headnotes

[1] An untimely notice of appeal requires dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

[2] A motion for clarification filed in the trial court does not delay rendition of a final order unless it qualifies as an authorized motion, such as a motion for rehearing.

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Key Quotes

“The time for taking an appeal is a jurisdictional requirement established by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b). Where the notice of appeal is not filed within thirty days of rendition, the appellate court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction over the appeal.”
Establishes that the 30-day appeal deadline is jurisdictional and mandatory

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Facts & Procedural History

The trial court entered a final order dismissing Tyler's second amended complaint with prejudice on February 23, 1996. Tyler filed a motion for clarif…

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Topics

Disqualification Of Judge Motion For Reconsideration Motion For Rehearing

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Opinion of the Court

Don Tyler appeals a final order dismissing his second amended complaint with prejudice, which was filed on February 23, 1996. Tyler filed his notice of appeal on September 30, 1996. Because the notice was untimely, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The time for taking an appeal is a jurisdictional requirement established by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b). Where the notice of appeal is not filed within thirty days of rendition, the appellate court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction over the appeal. See Peltz v. District Court of Appeal, Third Dist., 605 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 1992); Apone v. Green, 249 So. 2d 488, 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971).

The determinative issue in this ease centers on the rendition date of the February 23, 1996, order. Tyler argues that his motion for clarification filed February 28, 1996, delayed rendition of the order. However, Tyler’s motion for clarification was not an “authorized” motion that would delay rendition of the final order. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.020(h); see also Wagner v. Bieley, Wagner & Associates, Inc., 263 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla.1972) (holding that an unauthorized motion not permitted under the rules has no effect on rendition); Adventist Health System/Sunbelt Inc. v. Kiss, 510 So. 2d 971, 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).

While Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h) was amended in 1992 to ensure that motions for clarification were included in those types of motions that delay rendition, the motion for clarification referred to in the rule is the appellate motion for clarification under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330. See Committee Notes to Rule 9.020, subdivision (g), (1995). The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize the filing of a motion for clarification.

Thus, the only way that Tyler’s motion for clarification would be an “authorized” motion that would delay rendition would be if it were deemed to be a motion for rehearing. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530 (1996). However, Tyler’s motion for clarification cannot be considered a motion for rehearing because he failed to raise any matters that were not previously considered. See Diamond Cab Co. of Miami v. King, 146 So. 2d 889, 891 (Fla.1962).

Nevertheless, this court recognizes that rendition of the February 23, 1996, final order was delayed through a different method. Judge J. Dale Durrance, who entered the February 23, 1996, final order, subsequently was disqualified.

On June 14, 1996, Tyler filed a timely motion for reconsideration. This motion effectively revived the trial court’s jurisdiction over. the case for the limited purpose of reconsidering previous judicial orders entered by Judge Durrance. See § 38.07, Fla. Stat. (1995); Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(h).

The case was reassigned to Judge Robert A. Young. Judge Young granted Tyler’s motion for reconsideration, and on July 22, 1996, entered an order which essentially affirmed Judge Durrance’s previous final order. Once Judge Young’s order dated July 22, 1996, was filed, the trial court’s substantive jurisdiction evaporated and the February 23, 1996, order was rendered. See State ex rel. Cantera v. District Court of Appeal, 555 So. 2d 360 (Fla.1990).

Tyler was required to file his notice of appeal within thirty days of Judge Young’s order dated July 22, 1996. Because Tyler did not file his notice of appeal until September 30,1996 this court is without jurisdiction. See Janelli v. Pagano, 492 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Accordingly, this appeal is hereby dismissed.

PARKER, C.J., and PATTERSON and NORTHCUTT, JJ., concur.

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Citator

Cited By

The Am. Auto. Ass'n. v. C.D.S. Towing & Recovery Inc., 805 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)

…nt established by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b). Where the notice of appeal is not filed within thirty days of rendition, the appellate court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction over the appeal.” Tyler v. State, Governor Chiles, 718 So. 2d 811, 812 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The trial court’s order of March 30, 2000, granting the motion to dismiss plainly applied, without the need for further clarification, to CDS and Mr. Solomon. Because more than thirty days passed between the trial court’s Ma…
Rayburn v. Bright, 163 So. 3d 735 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)

…Fla. 5th DCA 1982)). Appellants filed their notice of appeal more than six months after the final judgment. Thus, we must address whether any of the post-judgment filings delayed rendition of the final judgment. See Tyler v. State, Governor Chiles, 718 So. 2d 811, 812 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (noting that the “only way” the appellant’s “motion for clarification would be an ‘authorized’ motion that would delay rendition would be if it were deemed to be a motion for rehearing” and holding that the “motion for clarif…
Griffis v. State, 90 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)

…So. 3d 19, 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); see also Mekertin v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 869 So. 2d 1286, 1288 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Because an appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider a late-filed appeal, it must dismiss the appeal. Tyler v. Chiles, 718 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). In addition, Griffis’ failure to timely file his notice of appeal cannot be excused due to his incarceration because as a licensee of the Department he had a statutory duty to keep the Department apprised of his current mailing…

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Authorities Cited

Wagner v. Bieley, 263 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972)
Arvin Peltz v. Dist. Court OF Appeal, 605 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1992)
State of Fla. ex rel. Eduardo Cantera v. Dist. Court OF Appeal, 555 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1990)
Janelli v. Pagano, 492 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
Diamond CAB Co. OF Miami v. King, 146 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1962)
Matteo S. Apone v. Green, 249 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)
Iseminger v. Morris, 249 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
Adventist Health System/Sunbelt Inc. v. Shandor Kiss, 510 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)

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