DEWAYNE ALLEN JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1998-07-31
No. 97-2102
GOSHORN and PETERSON, JJ., concur., HARRIS, J., concurs and concurs specially, -with opinion.
714 So. 2d 665 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1998)

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Synopsis

Dewayne Jones appeals his convictions for sexual battery and trespass, challenging the trial court's admission of evidence regarding a collateral crime committed nine years earlier. The appellate court reverses, finding that the similar fact evidence was improperly admitted to show propensity rather than to establish a common plan or scheme, and that the error was not harmless given the case's reliance on victim credibility.


Holding

The court held that the similar fact evidence was improperly admitted because it was relevant only to prove bad character or propensity to commit sexual battery, which is inadmissible under Florida law. The error was not harmless because the case turned on the victim's credibility, meaning the improper evidence may have affected the jury's verdict.


Headnotes

[1] Evidence of a collateral crime is inadmissible when its sole purpose is to prove a defendant's propensity to commit the charged offense.

[2] For similar fact evidence to be admissible to prove a common plan or scheme, the charged offense and the similar fact evidence must be strikingly similar and share unique…

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Key Quotes

“the charged offense and the similar fact evidence must be strikingly similar and "share some unique characteristic or combination of characteristics which sets them apart from other offenses_"”

Establishes the legal standard for admitting similar fact evidence under Heuring v. State

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Facts & Procedural History

Jones was convicted of sexual battery and trespass in an occupied structure. The trial court admitted evidence of a sexual battery committed by Jones …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Dewayne Allen Jones appeals his convictions and sentences for sexual battery and trespass in an occupied structure. On appeal, he contends it was error to allow the State to introduce evidence of a collateral crime committed nine years earlier. Under the facts of this case, we agree and reverse.

There was no physical evidence showing that Jones committed a sexual battery on the victim. While there were several similarities between the prior sexual battery and the allegations in this case, none of the similarities was so unique that it established a common plan or scheme. See Heuring v. State, 513 So. 2d 122 (Fla.1987) (holding that the charged offense and the similar fact evidence must be strikingly similar and “share some unique characteristic or combination of characteristics which sets them apart from other offenses_”). In fact, there were many more dissimilarities in the two cases than there were similarities. Further, identity was not an issue because Jones admitted being in the victim’s apartment.

We conclude, therefore, that the collateral crime evidence was introduced in an attempt to show Appellant’s propensity to commit the crime of sexual battery. This was impermissible. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997) (making similar fact evidence inadmissible when relevant only to prove bad character or propensity to commit the offense). Because the case turned on the victim’s credibility, the improper use of the similar fact evidence may have affected the jury’s verdict and therefore cannot be deemed harmless error. REVERSED and REMANDED.

GOSHORN and PETERSON, JJ., concur. HARRIS, J., concurs and concurs specially, -with opinion.

Concurrence
HARRIS, Judge,

HARRIS, Judge,

concurring and concurring specially:

I agree with the majority’s analysis. There was nothing unique about the prior sexual battery that would make testimony concerning it admissible in this case. This is yet another instance in which the State has attempted to make a strong case stronger by the introduction of highly questionable material. Again it has lost the gamble.

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