ERIC ADAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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ALLEN, Judge.
The appellant challenges a Baker Act order of involuntary placement for treatment pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes. As in Wickland v. State, 642 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), the order refers to a purported witness who did not testify, and describes the factual basis of the ruling by merely quoting from the petition for involuntary placement. Furthermore, while the court also made oral findings at the conclusion of the hearing, a need for treatment and medication does not in itself justify a Baker Act commitment. See Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Rather, there must be clear and convincing evidence that without treatment the appellant would pose a real and present threat of substantial harm to his own well-being, or a substantial likelihood that in the near future he would inflict serious bodily harm on himself or another, as evidenced by recent behavior. § 394.467(l)(a)2. Because the record evi dence does not satisfy this standard in the present case, the appealed order is reversed.
MINER and KAHN, JJ., concur.
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Boller v. State, 775 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…dication and the refusal to take psychotropic medication despite a deteriorating mental condition, standing alone, do not justify involuntary commitment under the Baker Act. See Blue, 764 So. 2d at 698; Singletary, 765 So. 2d at 181; Adams v. State, 713 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Rather, there must also be clear and convincing evidence that without treatment, the patient would pose a real and present threat of substantial harm to herself, or a substantial likelihood that in the near future she will infli…
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Lyon v. State, 724 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…om by herself or with the help of others, should never be involuntarily committed.” Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 983, 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). “[A]need for treatment and medication does not in itself justify a Baker Act commitment.” Adams v. State, 713 So. 2d 1063, 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). See also In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 481; Archer v. State, 681 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Jones v. State, 611 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Braden v. State, 575 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Welk v. State, 542 So…
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Blue v. State, 764 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…4.467(l)(a)2. The State established that Appellant refuses to take her medication, and therefore she is not stable and her mental condition may be deteriorating. This evidence alone does not in itself justify a Baker Act commitment. Adams v. State, 713 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). However, Appellant’s sister testified that she “cannot survive on her own” and that she scares her mother and the children in the family. Appellant is unable to care for her own children, and her mother must financially support…
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- Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Wickland v. State, 642 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)